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TROOP CONTROL: USE OF AIR COMMAND POSTS DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 81 pp 28-29

[Article "based on foreign press reports" by Maj Gen M. Belov, D. Sc. (Military), Professor: Helicopters in Troop Control"]

[Text]

Efficiency of helicopters in troop control and maintenance of stable and uninterrupted communication between forces and staffs is a point which has been least of all disputed since the first appearance of helicopters in the forces.

In modern conditions the role of helicopters in control and communication has grown considerably. One of the main reasons for this is increased spatial scope and fluidity of modern all-arms battle owing to the saturation of forces with powerful long-range weapons systems and highly mobile combat equipment, and also constantly increasing widths of attack and defence zones and mission limits of advance.

Another reason is helicopters' wide range of potentialities: they can be based directly in units' and formations' battle orders, can carry diverse control and communication equipment, allow efficient observation of large sectors of the battlefield, and can move quickly over long distances regardless of the nature of the terrain — a circumstance particularly important in conditions of highly fluid combat actions.

HELICOPTERS' CAPABILITIES

For control and communication tasks, use is foreseen of helicopters whether specially adapted or intended for other purposes. There is a noticeable tendency to provide the operational and tactical link with organic helicopter troop control subunits based at command posts of large groupings, formations or even units of land forces.

The existing control concepts presuppose the use of helicopters at all stages of the organisation and conduct of the battle, in most diverse conditions, particularly in situations requiring long distances to be covered to carry out a control mission.

The time for organising battle being limited, control bodies may use helicopters to carry out reconnaissance, in the course of which the commander can quickly inspect and assess the terrain, ascertain the location of friendly and enemy forces, adopt a well-grounded decision, outline the battle plan, use of men and equipment and manner of cooperation. Moreover, the commander and staff officers may use helicopters for personal contacts with their subordinates, and also to control preparation of forces for combat operations.

If necessary, helicopters with reconnaissance groups may be sent out to study march routes, establish the availability and capacity of bridges, and the passability of roadless terrain sectors. Such groups may also be assigned the mission to select and study halt and concentration areas, areas for siting missiles and artillery, and also for command posts, communication centres, radar stations and logistical bodies. Information on the terrain and march routes enables the commander to organise in the most rational way route and battle formations, to distribute reinforcements correctly (particularly engineer subunits), organise antiaircraft defence, logistical and other kinds of support, and also to determine the time of crossing the designated lines and arriving at predetermined areas.

According to foreign specialists, helicopters play an important role in organisation of the commandant's service. Besides controlling troop movements, maintaining discipline on the march and observation of the rules of troop deployment at concentration areas, they will certainly be used in the future for traffic control and communication between commandant's and traffic-control posts, and also between units and subunits moving at long distances from one another.

During crossing of water barriers, helicopters can pro-

vide uninterrupted control of the troops' actions in order to avoid traffic jams on the roads.

When assault or defence positions are being assumed, helicopters may be used to supervise subunits' punctual arrival at designated lines, departure of columns as regards the time and direction, timeliness of their advance to designated areas (positions), and also observation of camouflage measures. On arriving at the designated area by helicopter, the commander specifies the mission to his subordinates proceeding from the situation, gives the necessary instructions on cooperation and directs the battle.

Viewing large spaces from the helicopter and moving quickly from one direction to another, the commander can observe the actions not only of friendly but also of enemy forces, and thus influence the course of events.

To organise commitment of second echelon or reserve to action or to repulse a counterattack, the commander, arriving at troops' positions by helicopter, specifies the assigned mission or assigns a new one, and takes personal control of the battle, with the helicopter hovering over the most important sector or line of advance. Helicopters may also be widely used in the event of troops crossing water barriers on the march, pursuing the enemy or breaking off action and withdrawing, performing a manoeuvre to a new direction, for troop control or for specifying missions.

In the case of a sharp and unexpected change in the situation the commander may send a special reconnaissance patrol by helicopter to check controversial information and obtaining reliable data quickly. This patrol generally acts within the limits of a friendly unit (subunit) and reports the information obtained either by using communication facilities or personally. For this purpose, either organic control and communication or specially allotted reconnaissance or combat helicopters may be used.

Transport helicopters may be used for moving command posts during battle when the necessity arises to avoid a gap between command posts and troops and to deploy the former quickly in a new area in order to ensure uninterrupted troop control and timely specification of missions.

AIR COMMAND POSTS

The establishment of air command posts is considered a most promising trend in the use of helicopters for troop control purposes. Air CPs, regarded as a component of general command posts, are used in foreign armies at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

It is noteworthy that air CPs enable an all-arms commander to direct combat operations efficiently, settle questions of troop control operatively, manoeuvre with manpower and equipment, bring missions to the attention of forces quickly and forestall the enemy in concentrating the forces on the main line of advance.

Foreign armies make use of various types of helicopters to organise air CPs. The composition of heliborne task forces is determined proceeding from the tasks to be solved. Typical variants of providing air CPs with various communication facilities, including radio stations in order to ensure reliable communication with motorised infantry, artillery, air and other subunits are being worked out. It is emphasised that the computing and communication facilities fitted on helicopters enable an all-arms commander to take a well-grounded decision and concentrate artillery fire and air strikes on vital enemy installations.

A number of foreign armies use helicopters as air CPs at battalion level, and also in brigades and divisions. At battalion level use is made of light helicopters, carrying the commander, a staff and an artillery officer and a forward air controller. In brigades and divisions medium helicopters are generally used. Besides the commander they carry a group of staff officers of different specialities, who collect data on enemy and friendly forces, control artillery fire and guide aircraft to enemy targets, bring new combat missions to the notice of the forces in good time and maintain uninterrupted communication between them and their neighbours.

Plans are being drawn up to create air CPs fit for use by control bodies both in flight and after landing. One foreign variant of such an air CP envisages the use of a helicopter with a specially designed container attached underneath and provided with ventilation and illumination systems, and with wheels to move on land.

To ensure reliable and flexible troop control, it is considered essential to provide helicopters with TV, radar, relay and other special equipment, which will make it possible to transfer immediately to the CP or artillery fire positions images of the battlefield, results of using this or that type of weapons, troops' actions, newly detected targets and other installations.

AUTOMATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS

Further development of air CPs according to foreign specialists, calls for the use of automatic control systems (ACS), which are the material basis for the new control methods corresponding to maximum degree to the changes in methods and means of warfare, particularly bearing in mind the future. The level of development and practical use of ACS is an objective condition for enhancing the efficiency of the entire control system, for successful use of forces' higher potentialities and for defeating a well armed enemy.

An important condition of successful functioning of a modern control system based on the use of various computers and ACS complexes is reliability of communication ensured by using the most up-to-date equipment. To enhance reliability of communication, some foreign armies are developing and testing models of automatic switchboards accommodated in special heliborne containers for operational and tactical levels.

To protect communication, helicopters are intended for use mainly as ground communication systems duplicators and as mobile carriers of enemy radio communication jamming stations.

In the field of communication helicopters will retain their functions of cable layers and relay transmitters, especially in mountains, and will also be used to deliver combat documents and perform other tasks.

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OPERATIONAL DECEPTION: EXAMPLES FROM WW II

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 81 pp 42-44

[Article by Col N. Kobrin: "Operational Deception"]

[Text] SKILFUL ENEMY deception substantially contributed to the success of the Soviet forces in the offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). Its aim was to conceal preparation for action, to achieve surprise, and to mislead the enemy as to the direction of the main attack, the available manpower and equipment, the scope and time of an impending operation.

The build-up of large strike forces in the direction of the main effort involved considerable redeployment of forces, unobserved troop concentration playing a particularly important role in the circumstances. For instance, when preparing the counteroffensive near Stalingrad (autumn 1942), the Soviet Command faced the problem of providing concealment for a great number of troops and equipment in snow-covered steppes.

When tackling this difficult problem the following steps were taken. Forces were regrouped and brought up to the assault position usually at night. Units and formations moved to the concentration areas by long night marches, strictly observing march discipline. During day halts and in concentration areas the troops and their equipment were dispersed and thoroughly camouflaged. Out of 22 bridges built for the Don crossing, five were dummies. All the approaches to the bridges were camouflaged with vertical screens. The troops crossed the river only at night. In daytime alternate crossing sites were used, and only in case of emergency. The roads leading to the bridges were marked with stakes and signs and provided with road guides and traffic-controllers. First-line troops were replaced by newly arrived units only by night. To reach the assault position, units and subunits moved on the roads passing along depressions or behind reverse hill slopes. Wide use was also made of loudspeaker devices which produced loud sounds in the direction of the enemy positions in order to drown the noise of friendly tank and SP gun engines.

As a result, the counteroffensive of the Soviet forces near Stalingrad as well as their counteroffensive near Moscow (December 1941) took the enemy by surprise.

The directives and instructions issued by the nazi Command noted with alarm the difficulty of determining the true intentions of the Soviet side. "The distinctive signs of Russian preparations for a counteroffensive," wrote in a special directive Colonel-General Zeitler, Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Land Forces, "are perfect camouflage of all the units participating in the offensive, especially, tank formations... The ability of the Russians to conceal their preparations for an offensive from our scouts and observers is well known."

In 1943-45 the Soviet Command effected operational deception still more extensively. This can be well illustrated by the Lvov-Sandomir operation carried out in July 1944 by the forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev.

The plan of the operation envisaged the delivery of the main blow in the direction of Lvov (see Sketch). The purpose of the operation was to destroy the whole system of enemy defences and, after capturing Lvov, to reach the Vistula in order to establish bridgeheads there. Realising all the importance of this line of advance for the Soviet side the nazi Command took measures to cover it reliably.

The Soviet Command was to conceal the concentration of forces in the direction of the main effort by simulating a big build-up in a secondary direction. To this end the front HQ developed an operational deception plan. According to this plan the concentration of a tank army and a tank corps was to be simulated on the left flank of the front in the zone of the 1st Guards Army and the concentration of a tank army, several combined-arms formations, aircraft and a great number of artillery weapons in the zone of the 18th Army.

To realise this plan, first of all tank and artillery transportation by rail and also their unloading and delivery to concentration areas were simulated. Simulated concentration areas were also organised. False operations were supervised by special forces consisting of various fighting arms and political bodies. Officers responsible for carrying out the appropriate operations were appointed in each simulation area. General supervision was effected by the army commanders.

The simulations were conducted by forces detailed from the armies. They included infantry, tank, artillery and engineer units and subunits, loudspeaker devices and radio systems. Engineer units manufactured dummy equipment and simulated the construction of new bridges and the repair of roads. Infantrymen simulated "animation" and guard duties in the designated areas. Tanks and tractors moving close to the enemy forward edge to draw his attention, left traces in the area where dummy equipment was concentrated. To simulate concentration of tank and mechanised formations, quite a few dummies were manufactured. The number of simulated tanks, guns (mortars) and vehicles was 1,000, 1,300 and 300 respectively.

False troop concentration began on July 4. Trains loaded with dummy tanks and artillery started to simulate transportation activities in the evening when the enemy aircraft flew a recce mission in the front's rear communications area. Empties usually left the unloading point in the morning so as to be observed once more by enemy reconnaissance aircraft. The loading and unloading points were reliably guarded. Papers for simulated transportation were drawn up as if for normal trains arriving from other sectors of the front.

"Tank corps" moved from railway stations to concentration areas along specified routes using specially built roads and detours to bypass large inhabited localities. The roads were designated with various signs, their reconnaissance being carried out by a group of officers wearing tankmen's uniform.

Tanks usually moved in daytime, some of them making stops, mostly near inhabited localities. On their way to the concentration area the crews simulated tank repairs by removing tank tracks and questioned the inhabitants, simulating uncertainty as to the route to follow. During day halts they usually left their poorly camouflaged vehicles close to the roads. During night time tank marches were simulated by special columns of vehicles moving with side lights on and by teams of 15-20 men with flash lights. The soldiers, maintaining a distance, followed the designated route. When the enemy appeared, they turned on their flash lights for a while, not all at once. Powerful loudspeaker systems simulated the roar of tank engines, the picture being completed by dummy tanks, guns and motor vehicles.

To simulate high activity in the designated areas, special teams moved dummy equipment here and there, improved its camouflage and simulated burning "tanks" after enemy fire. At night some tanks moved along the roads and fields to leave traces there. Fires were burning day and night. During air raids some of them were extinguished and AA fire was opened up. Roving guns and mortars were used to simulate concentration of artillery units and their operation. Special radio sets broadcast at intervals to simulate HQ activity. Such broadcasts were limited to meet the requirements of radio discipline strictly observed when preparing for an offensive.

During the last two days before the beginning of the operation measures were taken to simulate preparation for the offensive. For instance, reconnaissance in force was carried out several times, sappers were used to make false lanes through mine fields in front of the forward edge and units' advance to departure areas was simulated.

All these steps taken by the Soviet Command proved their worth. Expecting the offensive to be launched in this direction the enemy did not remove a single division from this sector of the front. On the contrary, he transferred a tank and an infantry division to the Stanislav direction in order to reinforce his defence there. The nazi Command found out the true direction



of the main attack when it was too late to redeploy troops.

Operational deception measures taken in the direction of the front's main attack also were a success. Front and Army HQ's elaborated all their plans with the participation of a strictly limited number of generals and officers. No documents were issued in writing, the commanders of units and formations being given verbal orders.

Trains carrying tanks, artillery and manpower were unloaded only at night. After being unloaded the equipment was immediately transferred to the specified areas prepared in advance. When it was still dark tank tracks were carefully camouflaged and all empties removed from the unloading point.

Departure areas, fire positions and routes of advance were organised only by engineer units holding defences there and whose presence was known to the enemy. The camouflage effect was checked by air observation. The commandant and traffic-control services organised there ceased their activity by dawn. Various stocks and transportation facilities were thoroughly camouflaged and the zones located within enemy visibility were provided with vertical screens and a great number of trenches and communication trenches.

Thus, thanks to operational deception skilfully effected by the forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front it was possible to mislead the enemy as to the composition of the Soviet main forces, the time fixed for the offensive and the direction of the main attack.

Operational deception was carried out both when preparing for and during the operation. For instance, during the offensive the Soviet Command simulated a concentration of forces in secondary directions in order to divert enemy reserves and some of his forces from the main direction. At night time units advancing in secondary direction frequently intensified their activity, making the enemy transfer his reinforcements there. However, at dawn the Soviet forces continued their advance in the main direction with increased strength and vigour. This caused confusion and nervousness in enemy actions.

When pursuing the enemy the Soviet Command used false advancing columns so as to mislead the enemy as to the scope of the operations and the manpower and equipment available.

Combat experience shows that operational deception can yield fruit only if measures are perfectly planned, organised, concealed, likely, timely and varied. It is also necessary to strictly observe camouflage rules, continuously check its state both from the ground and the air.

Stereotyped methods of enemy deception must not be used. In modern warfare, commanders and staffs must take a well-considered and creative approach to solving this problem.

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PRINCIPLES OF PARTY-POLITICAL WORK DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 81 pp 2-6

[Article by Col Gen M. Sobolev, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Leninist Principles of Party-Political Work"]

[Text]

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, possessing enormous experience in the revolutionary and reorganising activities, exercises leadership of the Armed Forces. This leadership is multi-faceted and embraces a wide range of problems. It organically combines the theoretic substantiation of the Socialist Homeland's defence, the tasks and nature of the Armed Forces and the solution of practical questions. Purposeful Party-political work and strengthening of the political organs' and Party organisations' role and influence upon all aspects of the life and combat activities of the Armed Forces are the most important means of the CPSU for influencing the development of the Soviet Armed Forces and raising their combat readiness. The 26th CPSU Congress stressed this with a particular force.

Party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy represents the CPSU's ideological and organisational activities among servicemen in explaining and putting into practice Party policy and decisions, in the communist education of the personnel and in mobilising them to fulfil the tasks confronting the subunits, units and ships. In assessing the significance of this work for the army and navy the CPSU proceeds from the scientifically grounded principle that, besides technical equipment of the forces, a decisive role in winning battles belongs to the consciousness and morale of the popular masses. The main force on the battlefield is man. As was underscored at the 26th CPSU Congress: "The combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces is a durable alloy of high technology, military skill, and indomitable morale."

The character of relations in the society surrounding man exerts the main influence upon his consciousness. Socialist public relations mould a firm and ideologically staunch citizen-patriot, with high moral qualities. But the formation of socialist consciousness does not occur spontaneously, of itself; it is carried out actively and purposefully. In the Armed Forces this task is solved by Party-political work. V. I. Lenin attached great

significance to it. He underlined that "where political work among the troops is conducted most thoroughly, — ...there we have no laxity in the army, there its organisation and morale are best, and there we have the most victories."

In the grim years of the Civil War and foreign military intervention (1918-20), when the newly born Red Army had to fight against superior enemy forces, V. I. Lenin insisted that Party-political work in the forces should not be interrupted. He constantly wanted to know what measures were being taken to improve it. Although extremely busy with Party and state affairs, V. I. Lenin always maintained contact with the army's political workers. Before being sent to the front members of the Revolutionary Military Councils and Military Commissars would go to Lenin for advice and recommendations concerning their practical activities.

The most important principles of Party-political work were formed on the basis of V. I. Lenin's teaching on the Communist Party's leading and guiding role in socialist society, on the defence of the Socialist Homeland and Soviet military construction and also his directions and recommendations on the education of serviceman. Subsequently these principles came to be known as Leninist principles. They are the basic propositions and main requirements for military councils, commanders, political organs, Party and YCL activists in their practical work of educating the personnel.

Party-political work in the USSR Armed Forces is conducted from strictly Party and class positions, and in the spirit of lofty communist ideology. This basic Leninist principle means that the tasks and content of Party-political work in the army are determined by the Communist Party's ideology and policies and correspond to the social nature and character of the socialist military organisation, and to the peculiarities and historical purpose of the Soviet Army, an army of a new type.

The ideological and theoretical basis of Party-political work is the Marxist-Leninist teaching. It reflects with the utmost correctness and gives a profound analysis of the laws and motive forces of social development and illuminates the road of transition to a society without classes, without exploitation of man by man, without national oppression, enmity and wars among peoples, to a society of universal welfare and people of all-round development — to communist society.

The basis for moulding lofty political, practical and moral qualities in the Soviet fighting men is Marxism-Leninism. In the Soviet Armed Forces great attention is paid to the political education of soldiers, sergeants and officers, with due regard for the specific nature of each contingent of servicemen. For instance, in higher military-educational institutions future commanders and political workers, engineers and other military specialists do not only receive comprehensive military and technical knowledge, but also profoundly master Marxist-Leninist theory and become active proponents in the army and navy of the policies pursued by the Communist Party and Soviet Government. In units and on ships the officers raise their ideological level in Marxist-Leninist study groups. The basic form of ideological training for privates and sergeants is political instruction.

Political instruction helps servicemen to acquire a profound knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, to arm themselves with Lenin's teachings on the defence of the Socialist Homeland and to understand the CPSU's home and foreign policy. It multiplies the fighting men's spiritual forces and contributes to develop high moral, political and psychological qualities in soldiers, sergeants and officers.

The Party and class approach has been the guiding principle of Party-political work ever since the creation of the Red Army. V. I. Lenin taught that to solve questions from class positions was indispensable in all spheres of the Party activity. The RCP(B)* programme adopted by the Eighth Party Congress in 1919 and drafted by V. I. Lenin, says: "Military training and educational work in the Red Army is conducted on the basis of class unity and socialist education. Therefore, it is necessary to have political commissars from among reliable and selfless Communists... and to create communist cells in every unit..." These decisions were based on the nature of the army of a new type—the defender of the achievements of the Great October Socialist Revolution—and on the class principle of recruitment of units and formations from among representatives of the working masses.

In subsequent years too Party-political work did not lose its class nature. Today it is conducted in accordance with the interests of the entire Soviet

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* RCP(B) — the Russian Communist Party Bolsheviks was the former name of the CPSU.

people and its servicemen — representatives of the friendly classes, workers, collective farmers and people's intelligentsia, embodying the moral and political unity of Soviet society, friendship of the peoples of the USSR and proletarian internationalism.

At lessons, talks and lectures for servicemen the commanders, political workers and Party activists show by vivid examples and facts the advantages of the socialist economic system over the capitalist economy, the democratism and humanism of the Soviet way of life and lay bare the falseness and reactionary essence of imperialist propaganda. All the activities conducted in the army and navy pursue a clear-cut ideological course, and all social phenomena and actual events are examined from clear-cut Party positions. This makes it possible to convincingly expose the slanderous attacks on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and to ensure that every fighting man can himself give a Party and class evaluation of the events taking place in the world.

An important feature of the Party and ideological principle is truthfulness. V. I. Lenin demanded that the people be always told the truth, that real facts should not be concealed from them, and shortcomings, difficulties and mistakes must not be hushed up. True to Lenin's behests the Communist Party constantly teaches its cadres and all Communists to bring truth to the people, to speak openly of difficulties, to criticise mistakes, disclose shortcomings and render assistance in overcoming them. This also applies in full to the Armed Forces, whose personnel are always well informed about all the most important events. Neither shortcomings nor unsolved problems are kept secret from the fighting men. Truthfulness and principledness are distinguishing features of the service activities of commanders, political workers and military engineers.

Inseparable from the Party and class principle, and high communist ideology is also such a principle of Party-political work as its **close link with the practice of communist construction**, with life and the tasks being solved by the Armed Forces.

All the combat training and political education of the Soviet fighting men are connected with the affairs of the country and its people, with their goals. "The barracks cannot and must not conduct a solitary and secluded life," one of the Party documents underlined. The Soviet fighting man is not simply a defender of his Socialist Homeland. He is its master and his people's concerns are near and understandable to him. Soldiers and sergeants, seamen and starshinas, praporshchiks and mitchmans, officers and generals take a keen interest in everything that is done in the working collectives. They draw their strength and inspiration for service with the colours from the successes of these collectives.

The Party does not tolerate secluded activities of the Armed Forces' political organs and Party organisations. Back in the years of the Civil War the Communists of the army and navy and the political organs of units and formations established close contacts with the local Party committees. They exchanged experience and rendered each other assistance and support. Today these contacts have become still more lasting, having been enriched with new forms.

All Party-political work in the army and navy is conducted as a component part of general Party construction. The political organs and Party organisations of the Soviet Armed Forces build their work on the basis of the general Party norms and principles of Party leadership with due regard, of course, for specific army conditions. In organising and conducting Party-political work, the commanders, political organs, Party and YCL organisations show the fighting men the successes achieved by the Soviet people in building communism, explain to them their concrete practical tasks, mobilise them to achieve new heights in combat training and political education and in strengthening discipline. Party-political work is directed at making each fighting man realise that he is an active participant in the building of communism and deeply understand his personal responsibility for reliably safeguarding the achievements of socialism.

Strict adherence to the principle of the close connection of Party-political work with the practice of communist construction contributes to strengthening the unity of the army and the people, to raising the personnel's political consciousness and the combat readiness of units and ships. Of great significance is the principle of **concreteness and purposefulness**. "Less political fireworks," wrote V. I. Lenin, "and more attention to the simplest but living facts of communist construction..."

A high degree of concreteness and purposefulness was characteristic of the Party-political work conducted in the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). At every stage of struggle against the nazi German occupants, whether in the defensive operations of the Soviet forces or in their swift offensive or the liberation of other nations from fascist oppression, precise tasks were set before the political organs and Party organisations. Proceeding from them the political workers, Party and YCL activists always sought concrete forms and means of influencing the servicemen.

The experience of many years shows that Party-political work must not be conducted "in general" or "regardless of time and space." It is always subordinated to fulfilling definite goals. Today, in peace time, its main goal is to ensure a raising of units' and ships' combat readiness. The efforts of political organs, Party and YCL organisations are directed at getting all servicemen show perseverance in mastering the latest means and methods of armed struggle, at ensuring exemplary performance of combat duties, raising the quality of field, air and naval training, moral, political, psychological and physical steeling and at maintaining the order prescribed by the regulations. Political workers, Party and YCL activists, following the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, render the commanders all-round assistance in creating conditions which contribute to raising the tactical, technical and special training of the servicemen, and especially of the leading specialists. The faultless functioning of the most sophisticated equipment in combat situations depends precisely on the skill of these people.

Concreteness and purposefulness are characteristic of the work of the political organs and Party organisations to achieve strict discipline, which in the Soviet Armed Forces is founded on the servicemen's high political consciousness and profound understanding of their patriotic duty to the Communist Party and Soviet Government. This ensures favourable conditions for political workers and Party activists to instil into the army collectives the spirit of high organisation and to ensure the servicemen's strict execution of their duty. Of particular importance in strengthening military discipline is the conduct of everyday educational work with each individual in subunits. Account must also be taken of the deep changes that have taken or are taking place in the military art and in the Soviet fighting men's general educational and cultural level.

The CO, vested with one-man authority, maintains high military discipline in a unit or on a ship. He puts into practice the Communist Party's policy and directs the training and education of his subordinates consistently and with a firm hand. In his activities the Soviet commander is constantly supported by the political apparatus and Party and YCL organisations. Their mutual friendly work ensures efficiency and effectiveness in educating the personnel.

Indissolubly connected with concreteness and purposefulness is the principle of **operativeness and continuity of Party-political work.** V. I. Lenin taught that the more complicated and tense the situation was, the stronger political influence upon the fighting men should be.

Soviet commanders, political workers and Party and YCL activists strive to carry out Party-political work in all conditions and situations, and the more complicated the tasks, the more active this work should be. The termination of Party-political work would inevitably lead to a weakening of political influence upon the personnel and a lowering of the Armed Forces' morale and combat activity.

Operativeness and continuity in Party-political work are achieved by setting the tasks facing the personnel. In training and combat situations the commanders and political workers strive to react in time to the events taking place and, depending on the conditions, they reorganise Party-political work, directing it at solving the most important tasks. For better mutual information the Party organs and political organisations in units maintain constant contacts with the staffs. Organisational and political work is constantly conducted among the personnel in units and subunits.

In fulfilment of combat training and political education tasks and during combat duty, the significance of the Communists' personal example increases. At such times the Communists' individual work with the personnel is intensified. Its main aim is not only to show how this or that soldier or sailor knows his obligations but also to render concrete assistance to those who need it. In a highly dynamic situation it is not always possible to conduct mass measures. Therefore serious attention must be paid to the correct distribution of Communists over all decisive sectors. It should be noted that the political workers of the Red Army in the last war did everything to ensure that members and candidate members of the Party were always in the front ranks of attackers and in the thick of defence, and that there was no slackening in the activity of Party and YCL organisations, no matter how complex the situation on the front was. It goes without saying that the experience of the war years is widely used now.

One of the distinctive features of Marxism-Leninism is unity of theory and practice, words and deeds. From this ensues **the principle of unity of ideological and organisational work.** Politics, V. I. Lenin noted, begins where there are millions. It is pursued through organisations and through the people constituting these organisations. Following this tenet of Lenin's, the Communist Party tirelessly strives to ensure the necessary unity of the solution of economic, political and military problems with ideological and educational work.

Unity of ideological and organisational work is an important feature in the activities of military councils, commanders, political organs and Party

and YCL organisations. This unity is achieved by methods of persuasion and high political consciousness of the instructors and pupils forming the basis of organisational work.

Take, for instance, experience in organising socialist emulation in the Soviet Armed Forces. It became an effective motive force in the struggle to achieve high fighting efficiency and combat readiness of units, and has acquired an unprecedented mass character. The organisers of emulation in the army set themselves the goal of achieving not only high marks in combat training and political education, of economising more on materials and raising the quality of rationalisation proposals, etc., but also of strengthening the influence of emulation on the participants themselves. Real success comes when the fighting men's combat ardour is permeated with conscious initiative, when the achievement of high results is closely linked with spiritual growth of the personnel, when it contributes to enlarging their political and cultural outlook, strengthening discipline and forming high moral and combat qualities. Therefore painstaking organisational work in developing socialist emulation in units and on ships is always reinforced by various sorts of political work.

The Leninist principles of Party-political work stood the test of time. They were further developed in the Decisions of Party Congresses and Plenary Meetings of its Central Committee and in the Resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee. They were also widely reflected in the Principles concerning political organs and instructions to the CPSU and YCL organisations in the Soviet Army and Navy. The 26th CPSU Congress was an important stage in their development.

The basic principles of Party-political work are not isolated from each other. They present a dialectical unity; high effectiveness of Party-political work is ensured by their full interdependence and interrelation. Therefore their organisers strive to accomplish practical tasks in a complex, joining in a single process the politico-ideological, military, labour and moral education of the personnel.

The Soviet Armed Forces constantly search for ways of raising the effectiveness of Party-political work. These important problems are discussed at conferences and meetings of political workers and secretaries of Party and YCL organisations, and also in the periodical press. Books, articles and speeches by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev, his regular meetings with leaders of the Armed Forces, war veterans, soldiers and officers of units and ships and his letters to army collectives and individual servicemen have a great theoretical and practical meaning. Rich experience of Party-political work is generalised in them and concrete recommendations and advice are given to commanders, political workers, Party and YCL activists on the education of servicemen.

It is clear why such great attention is paid in the Soviet Armed Forces to questions of Party-political work at the present stage. The arms drive, which is intensifying from year to year through the fault of imperialist circles, and the mounting military preparations, directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, require the army and navy to be always ready for action. This presupposes constant attention to raise the level and effectiveness of all Party-political work. Therefore the commanders, political workers and Party and YCL organisations strain every effort to further raise the political maturity of the personnel, to strengthen their unity in support of the CPSU and Soviet Government and raise the responsibility of the Soviet fighting men for defending the socialist achievements of the people and excellent fulfilment of their patriotic and internationalist duty.

"Party-political work with the personnel and their ideological training," noted General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "was and remains a mighty weapon of our army." The experience of Soviet military construction and the entire practice of combat training and political education of the personnel convincingly confirm the profound truth of these words.

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MULTINATIONAL CHARACTER OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES NOTED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 81 pp 39-41

[Article marking "May 9--Day of Victory over Nazi Germany" by Col N. Kurov: "Shoulder to Shoulder"]

[Text] **On May 9, 1945 the fighting and labour efforts of the Soviet people culminated in a historic victory over German fascism. This was a triumph not only of the Soviet arms, the Soviet social and state system but also of the Leninist ideas of internationalism, fraternity and friendship among peoples.**

THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION of 1917 brought full equality to all nations and ethnic groups in Russia. Friendship and fraternal cooperation of the peoples of different nationalities grew and developed in the joint struggle for Soviet power and in socialist construction.

Of historic significance was the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1922. It opened wide opportunities for comprehensive social, economic and cultural development of the peoples, particularly those which had formerly been backward. Under the leadership of the Communist Party the Soviet people carried out within a short period of time industrialisation of the country and collectivisation of the agriculture and accomplished a cultural revolution. At the same time they always kept in mind Lenin's warning that peoples who chose the way of socialist development cannot preserve their freedom and independence unless they form a close alliance against imperialist aggression. Working hard to implement the five-year programmes from 1929 to 1941 the Soviet people created the material and technical basis of the country's defence potential and built powerful multinational Armed Forces.

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 was a severe test for the Soviet state and social structure. The unity of the peoples in the USSR, the links and ties between them were also tested.

The German political and military leaders relied on contradictions which, they believed, existed and would inevitably sharpen between the different nations in the USSR. They did not doubt that they would manage to split the unity of the Soviet state and the army, sow discord among the peoples and alienate them from the Russian people. A great variety of methods were tried to this end, nationalism being the primary weapon. A German High Command directive insistently urged "to make use of the contradictions between Estonians, Letvians, Lithuanians and Russians in the Baltic area, and similarly between the local peoples and the Russians in the Caucasus.

But their calculations proved utterly wrong. All the peoples of the USSR rose to defend their Motherland against the fascist aggressor. Brought up on the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism the Soviet people burned with one single aspiration — to defend their socialist home country and destroy the invader.

Communists representing all the nationalities of the Soviet Union fought in the vanguard against fascism. Hundreds of thousands of Communists from the multinational Russian Federation, two thirds of the Ukrainian Communists, thousands of Party members from Byelorussia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenia and other republics joined the fighting ranks in the first months of the war.

In the very first battles the enemy came to feel the power of unity and spirit of the Soviet Army. In every unit there were both men and officers of different nationalities. For instance, the Brest fortress was defended in the summer of 1941 by a garrison comprising men and officers of over 30 nationalities: Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Kazakhs, Armenians, Moldavians, Uzbeks, Azerbaijanians, Tatars and others. Their heroic resistance has

gone down in history as a symbol of patriotism and unbreakable spirit of the Soviet people.

One of the first days of the war witnessed a feat by Captain Gastello, a Byelorussian, and his aircrew, who flew their damaged aircraft onto an enemy troop concentration. During the war similar deeds of self-sacrifice and devotion were repeated by dozens of Soviet airmen of different nationalities.

The Soviet country's history will forever preserve the memory of those who displayed miracles of courage and determination in defending Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Stalingrad, Novorossiisk and other towns and villages. Every page of their history abounds in examples of the fraternal solidarity and mutual aid of the Soviet nations.

When the enemy besieged Leningrad its defenders, soldiers and citizens, swore to win or to die. The entire Soviet nation stood firm in spirit with the city of Lenin. The people of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, grateful for Leningrad's help in their struggle for Soviet power, for economic and cultural development of their republics, now rallied to the aid of the city as the deadly menace loomed over it. In a message of encouragement to the besieged defenders of Leningrad in summer 1941 the working people of Alma-Ata wrote: "In these hard days we are with you, brothers... The best sons of the Kazakh people are fighting bravely in the ranks of the gallant Red Army, valiantly defending Leningrad..."

The besieged city was visited by numerous delegations from the Kazakh, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Tajik and Turkmen Soviet Republics. They brought presents collected by the working people of these republics and told the Leningrad people that their resistance commanded respect and inspired the people working on the home front to ever new labour efforts. That fraternal aid and support strengthened the spirit of the defenders and their confidence in the future victory.

During the days and nights of the great battle for Moscow hundreds of trains with reinforcements, ammunition, weapons and food were incessantly coming to the capital from Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Urals and Siberia. Red Army men of tens of nationalities took part in the traditional military parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941. Marching past the Lenin Mausoleum, the units proceeded directly to the front.

The grandiose Battle of Stalingrad produced thousands of heroes among fighting men of different nationalities. "Pavlov's house" has gone down in the history of that battle. A group of men under Sergeant Ya. Pavlov captured the German strongpoint in that house and held it for many days and nights, repelling furious enemy attacks. The tiny garrison of men of different nationalities embodied the inviolable unity of all the Soviet nations in this war. "There would have been no Stalingrad victory," said L. I. Brezhnev, "if all the sons of Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic republics, Caucasus, Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia had not stood shoulder to shoulder in the Stalingrad trenches."

The battles in the Caucasus, at Kursk, in Byelorussia and the Ukraine, the operations to liberate the European countries were all one people's war of the USSR nations against the common enemy.

The army and the people were one inseparable whole. Delegations from the national republics, regions and districts were frequent visitors at the front. Labour collectives took patronage over combat units and formations. Inspiring were the letters containing the instructions of the working people to their fellow countrymen fighting at the front. In autumn 1942, when the German army was still advancing eastward, the working people of Kirghizia sent their compatriots at the front a message urging them to spare nothing in their fight. "We shall be proud," the message said, "when you, sons of Kirghizstan, are cheered by the fraternal peoples delivered from the hitlerite tyranny." These messages reminded the soldiers of their duty to their multinational Homeland, called on them to bring freedom to the Soviet people and the peoples of other countries suffering under the heel of German fascism. The Soviet Army men received these messages as sacred mandates of their people, their mothers, and fathers, their wives and children.

The indestructible moral and political unity of the Soviet people was vividly manifested in the unprecedentedly widespread partisan movement which swept all the German-occupied areas of the Soviet Union. In reply to the call of the Communist Party thousands of partisan detachments were formed in Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Ukraine, Moldavia, the Caucasus, the Crimea, and in all the occupied areas of the Russian Federation. Not a single nation yielded to the "whip," nor was tempted by "sweets" of the invader. The fascists failed to establish puppet governments in the occupied Soviet areas. Describing the situation in Byelorussia Reichsminister A. Rosenberg admitted that the population "had been so infected by the Bolshevist philosophy that no conceivable form of self-government could be established there for want of the necessary social or personal conditions, or any reliable positive elements."

The partisan movement grew into a force which struck terror in the enemy. There was probably not a single partisan detachment that did not include fighters of different nationalities. The partisan brigades which operated in the Ukraine listed over 40 nations and ethnic groups.

Victory would have been unthinkable without the invaluable contribution of those who worked for it in the rear. The tireless work of men and women in Moscow, Leningrad, the Urals and Siberia merged with the efforts of their brothers and sisters in the Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Numerous factories were transferred from the battle areas to Kazakhstan, the Urals and Siberia. They were promptly erected on the new sites and started production for the

war. A huge and complex industrial system was put on wheels, redeployed in a new area and again put in full-scale operation within but a few months. This tremendous labour feat was only possible in a family of Soviet fraternal republics.

During the war years Kazakhstan produced 85 per cent of the lead, 60 per cent of the manganese, 30 per cent of the copper turned out in our country. Kirghizia became a major supplier of strategic materials including antimony, mercury, tungsten and molybdenum. The Georgian factories produced airplanes, automatic weapons, ammunition and clothes. Azerbaijan, Bashkiria and Tataria supplied the fronts with oil products. The Urals and Siberia developed into a huge smithy forging arms.

The multinational working class, peasantry and intelligentsia displayed unprecedented labour enthusiasm. Due to their efforts the Soviet Union had surpassed nazi Germany by the end of 1942 in both quantity and quality of weapons and combat equipment.

The Soviet family of peoples stood fast and was victorious in the titanic struggle against fascism. M. I. Kalinin, a prominent state and Party leader, wrote: "The genuine brotherhood of peoples of the Soviet Union fostered carefully in peacetime, flourished brightly during the war and surprised not only our enemies but even our friends abroad." Never in the past has heroism assumed such massive dimensions and affected such broad masses of people as it did in the Great Patriotic War. Almost all the nations and ethnic groups in our Soviet Land are represented among the 11,600 Heroes of the Soviet Union.

The collision with the most dangerous enemy of humanity, German fascism, tangibly proved that the Soviet peoples can preserve their freedom, independence and socialist gains only in close alliance and by combined efforts. The outcome of the war upset the hopes of world imperialism for the collapse of the Soviet multinational state, for a revival of feuds and clashes between the Soviet nations. The peoples of the USSR fought shoulder to shoulder and worked heroically during the war, thus showing the whole world the might and indestructibility of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

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AIR FORCE TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

Officer Misconduct Follow-Up

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jan 81 p 2

[Follow-up report: "'Taking a One-Sided View'"]

[Text] The critical article published by that title on 17 October 1980 was examined in the Air Force political directorate, as Lt Gen Avn N. Tsymbal informed the editors. It was recognized that the newspaper correctly criticized serious shortcomings in the official activities of officers P. Lupashko and V. Lanetskiy, as well as G. Vizerov and V. Kuznetsov.

Lt Col Lupashko was reduced in position and made to answer to the party for undignified conduct and abuse of official position. The very same steps were taken toward Maj Lanetskiy, who showed a lack of principle in evaluating the state of affairs in the unit.

The article also was discussed at a management conference of the Red Banner North Caucasus Military District aviation. It had a broad response during the report-election campaign in party organizations.

The party committee of the SKVO [North Caucasus Military District] aviation directorate gave strict instructions to CPSU members officers Vizerov and Kuznetsov for serious shortcomings in their work style.

Commander Training Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 81 p 2

[Article by Maj N. Besedin, deputy commander for flight training of aviation regiment, 1st Class military pilot: "The Commander's Development: 'You Have Been Entrusted with the Flight'"]

[Text] Senior lieutenants Ye. Rotyakov and L. Khismatulin completed higher aviation school just two years ago, but already are commanding flights. The primary task of the flight commander is to train and indoctrinate his subordinate pilots in practical work, and to be an instructor. One cannot get by without firm skills and good flight training, for the chief pedagogic method of the instructor is "Follow me." He teaches by demonstration and by personal example. How does this work for young commanders?

Both achieved a great deal. They fly at night with the established weather minimum and perform intercepts in the clouds at medium and high altitudes. But this concerns personal training. If we are speaking of their ability to indoctrinate and train pilots, it must be admitted that the young officers still do not have firm skills.

For example, Rotyakov only recently received authorization for instruction flights, and then only during the day under simple weather conditions. But who will "take" his subordinates at night and in the clouds? The senior comrades from the squadron and regimental headquarters, of course. There is nothing to be done here, as they say, if the flight and methods training of young commanders is not yet at the level of modern demands. The young officers work assiduously, but diligence alone is not enough in flying. They need experience here as much as the air they breathe.

The commander and our unit methods council do a great deal to make the process of young flight commanders' development as painless as possible. A great deal here still depends on the selection in making an assignment to the position. The cream of the crop receive this honor. Another condition is that pilots with similar training should be selected as a rule for a young commander's flights. It is best if they graduated from school the same year. For example, 1979 higher military aviation school graduates are subordinate to Sr Lt L. Khismatulin. Sr Lt Ye. Rotyakov's flight is manned by young pilots who graduated last year.

The question might be raised as to what this does. I will answer: It eases the flight commander's work at first. The fact is that he mastered the program that his subordinates must master only recently, his skills are fresh and he can demonstrate in practice how best to perform a particular exercise, conduct a training session in a qualified manner and critique a flight.

Of course, we do not leave the young commanders alone with their concerns and anxieties. For example, I recently had to organize and hold a class with them on the topic "Methodology of conducting training on aviation equipment with flight pilots." Others went over lessons with them on the methodology of conducting a postflight critique and analyzing errors.

But the most important element in developing instructor skills unquestionably is flying practice. A well-known rule in aviation that a pilot teaches a pilot operates throughout the entire service career of every aviation commander, no matter what post he holds. Flight commander is the first step along this path. How he learns the techniques of training in the air at this time is the instructional and methods trait basically to be retained by him for all subsequent service.

We try to make our every flight with a young instructor to be of maximum instructiveness for him. From the very first we accustom the flight commander to the rear cockpit and the ability to analyze mistakes in flying techniques. I recently flew with Rotyakov for his authorization for instructor's work under simple weather conditions. The pilot successfully coped with the primary mission, but then I complicated the assignment. When I flew in the zone myself I intentionally placed the aircraft in a bank with a slight mistake. I also made an intentional error in placing the aircraft in a dive. I made a few other

minor mistakes. I asked the senior lieutenant on the ground what inaccuracies he had noticed in my flying techniques. The answer was gratifying. Rotyakov not only named, but competently critiqued the reasons for all my "mistakes." This instills assurance that the flight commander will analyze subordinates' actions knowledgeably and exactingly.

Sr Lt L. Khismatulin also managed to learn much of benefit. One senses this in his work with subordinates.

Lt S. Dolmatov probably was in a more difficult position as a commander and teacher: He had pilots in his flight with whom he had studied in school. But this lieutenant stood out among his comrades in his ability to work thoroughly on himself, by his desire to adopt all the best from senior comrades, and by his ability to analyze objective monitoring data. Here is a recent example. Lt N. Bychenkov, a subordinate of Dolmatov's, did not complete an exercise. Although the flight commander was not flying with him as instructor, he evaluated the pilot's actions in the flight in a fully qualified manner. The flight commander proved on the basis of objective monitoring data that Bychenkov began performing the steep climb for aiming at high altitude late, and as a result there was a loss of lock-on...

But even those qualities the aforementioned flight commanders possess still are not enough to train subordinates in practice. And so the squadron commander and his deputies--and often instructors from regimental headquarters--have to assume the primary burden of introductory and check flights for unprepared flight commanders. Their personal flight schooling suffers as a result, not to mention the violation of an important training principle that the immediate superior teaches his subordinate. I will refer to my own experience. Since the beginning of the training year I have been able to go up in a combat aircraft, i.e., to fly "for myself," only four times. All other flights were as an instructor...

It is not only objective circumstances, but we ourselves who are at fault for this. It is no secret that we sometimes are hasty in appointing a young pilot as flight commander. Then we either have to force his training or substitute for him in the work. The fact is there is an opportunity to arm commander candidates with instructional skills little by little. In any case we must develop young commanders carefully and show unremitting attention toward their development.

"You have been entrusted with the squadron"--I begin a talk with a young commander with these words. And I see how he is imbued with a sense of responsibility which he assumes for the training and indoctrination of defenders of the home skies on entering the position.

Need for Physical Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 81 p 4

[Article by Lt Col G. Ivanov: "Is It Only a Matter of Incentive? (Poor Concern Shown in Unit 'X' for Pilots' Physical Conditioning)"]

[Text] From the very beginning aerial combat assumed a dynamic, intense character. The flight commanded by Capt A. Kozhevnikov closed swiftly with the "enemy" without seeing him. Capt Kozhevnikov received instructions from the ground to

maneuver. If the flight managed to perform it with a maximum bank and overload it would seize the initiative; if not, the "enemy" would be in a favorable position. The flight precisely entered the computed steep trajectory...

Situations changed with dizzying speed more than a few times in this practice combat. The pilots experienced a very significant stress, both physical and psychological, but the officers competently coped with the overloads and other unpleasant factors accompanying aerial combat.

I had the thought that only people who are physically strong and conditioned are capable of this. And when I met Officer Kozhevnikov and his subordinates after the flight I was sure of the correctness of my supposition. All of them are 1st Class specialists and, moreover, all are good athletes and VSK [military sports complex] badge wearers. And what appears to be especially important is that all four of them fulfilled category norms on a very useful piece of special equipment for the pilot, the trapeze swing.

It was easy to assume from our discussion that the physical training process in this squadron, as well as in the unit as a whole, is well organized, that sports sections work regularly and mass competitions are held.

"That is not so," objected the officers unexpectedly. "We don't give physical training proper attention, and it is far from the best situation concerning mass sports work..."

Then where did they get such a high degree of conditioning and good athletic form? The answer is simple--all this is the result of the pilots' personal interest in their own physical conditioning and of the youthful energy which calls them to volleyball and basketball courts, to morning physical exercise and to the crosscountry route. The more so as an athletic facility of good quality has been created in the regiment and a general-purpose gymnasium has been built in which it is even possible to play tennis. By the way, special equipment also has been installed in the gymnasium--a trapeze swing, fixed rotating wheel and jumping net, which are very popular with the pilots. Young officers (and there is a majority of them in the regiment) realize that friendship with athletics provides them with immeasurably more than satisfaction from entertaining mobile games, runs in the woods or conditioning with cold water. Sports are their true ally in combat training, in mastering professional expertise and in strengthening their health.

In short, the benefits from active engagement in sports for aviators, especially pilots, was proven long ago. Regular training helps the majority of them to be in fighting shape all the time and to preserve flying longevity; and sometimes not just preserve it, but restore it. For example, three years ago Maj V. Sirenko began to have trouble with his heart. His flying future was questionable. Hardly had he returned to the unit from the hospital when the distraught officer went for advice to Capt Med Serv A. Shevlyakov, senior regimental physician.

"Perhaps I should move around less and safeguard my heart."

"Just the opposite," objected the physician. "Only movement and regular physical exercise can help you."

The physician advised the pilot which exercises were best included in activities and he helped draw up a plan for independent training. Maj Sirenko followed the plan exactly. He himself did not even notice how he became accustomed to the training and came to love physical exercises. The result was not slow in telling. A medical commission recently concluded that he was completely healthy and fit for flying operations.

Unfortunately, however, there are examples of another sort. I recall how Capt V. Firsov entered the room where the pilots rested with a heavy step during flight operations. Rivulets of sweat flowed down his face. One sensed that aerial combat demanded considerably greater strain of him than of others. The reason for that was insufficient physical conditioning. And the excess weight which appeared on the officer eloquently attested to the fact that he was not on good terms with sports, to put it mildly.

It was not only Capt Firsov who became heavier, but also Maj V. Kurguzov, Capt A. Filippov, Sr Lt V. Belov and Lt A. Karasev. Perhaps these officers require additional physical loads. When we began speaking about this with Capt Med Serv A. Shevlyakov, instead of answering he showed me his notes in a journal. Here is what was especially interesting in them: When aviators were preparing intensively last year for a review of athletic work, a drop in weight was observed even in pilots inclined to corpulence...

Consequently, there is no need for some special measures or additional training to get up a sweat. Regular training classes under the physical training program, morning exercises, mastery and passing of VSK norms, and practices in sections and teams in themselves fully ensure the pilots' proper athletic form. If, of course, the entire many-sided process of officers' physical conditioning is precisely arranged and if classes and practice sessions are arranged under a plan and are held regularly, at a high methods level.

But the trouble is that the pilots engage in organized physical training only rarely, from time to time, although Maj A. Goloshchapov, member of the unit sports committee, neatly places checkmarks in the reports.

Examples? One does not have to go far for them. When I was in this regiment the aviators were preparing for flights and their schedule called for a physical training class. Dinnertime was approaching and Maj Goloshchapov, after glancing restlessly at his watch, said: "The pilots apparently will come to the gymnasium after the working day..." But the officers did not come to the class. It was not held at all that day.

"All because we were going over the guidance documents and drawing out draft methods diagrams," explained squadron commander Lt Col N. Tankushin.

It is of course necessary to go over the documents and draw diagrams. But why must this be done in hours set aside for physical training activities? One sensed from everything that the squadron commander was merely giving an excuse and preferred to be silent about the true reason for disruption of practices. But it was not very difficult to guess that the reason was clear to him: The fact is that Lt Col Tankushin is a good methods specialist and, moreover, a candidate for master of sport in officer combined games. The commander was so enthusiastic in telling about how he had prepared the squadron purposefully last year for the

review of athletic work! At that time the aviators demonstrated good results: More than 90 percent of squadron personnel fulfilled the VSK norms and the subunit took first place in the unit.

"Then why are you giving so little attention now to officer physical conditioning?" I asked the squadron commander.

"There was an incentive then not to fall on our faces in the review. Now there is none..."

So this apparently is the reason. There is no question that an incentive is good. It urges one on and spurs a person to active actions. But is it only a matter of an incentive? The fact is there still are such concepts as a conscientious attitude toward duty and a striving toward constant perfection of pilots' professional expertise in which, by the way, not the last role is played by physical training and sports.

Squadron party organization secretary Capt A. Kozhevnikov and other party members raised the question more than once in party meetings about serious deficiencies in organization of the process of physical training and mass athletic work in the unit and suggested ways of remedying them. It is very unfortunate that neither the regimental commander nor his political deputy Maj V. Kupko wished to heed them. Unfortunately, this political worker adheres to the following opinion: Flights involving great physical stress allegedly are a complete substitute for athletic practices. One has to say that this is a strange position. It is hardly surprising after this that the officer pilots are forced to engage in sports as a personal initiative, so to speak, without an organization basis.

The results of regular athletic activities as well as an ignoring of such activities sometimes are not felt all at once. A love or nonlove for athletic training inevitably is reflected in aviators' flying longevity. Commanders and political workers must not forget this, or that it is their direct duty to bring up conditioned, physically fit aerial fighting men who are capable of performing the most difficult and responsible missions.

Flight Training Evaluation Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 April 81 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col V. Shevchenko, Red Banner Odessa Military District: "Strictness of the Evaluation"]

[Text] There were flight operations under way in 3d Squadron. The usual flight section, just as a month ago. This time the pilots were learning the art of conducting aerial combat behind the clouds.

Aviators were working with combat stress at the airfield in performing flight assignments. And a sign of today's combat training appeared clearly in this responsible attitude of the people toward the assigned task--evaluating their achievements by a stricter yardstick, in conformity with requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress. Squadron commander 1st Class military pilot Lt Col V. Nikiforov, a congress delegate, headed up the search for reserves for further improvement in combat proficiency.

"Back when the congress was in session," says Vladimir Frantsevich, "I made a mental note of how we had to improve our work in order to fulfill pledges and cope excellently with every flight assignment."

The regiment is an initiator of socialist competition among district aviation units and squadron personnel set the tone in training and service. Special concern is shown here for disseminating foremost experience and training young aviators.

Lieutenants S. Litvinenko, I. Avramenko and V. Chayko received permission for take-off. All of them are young officers and this is their second solo flight in minimum weather. But the lieutenants coped with the difficult assignment in exemplary fashion and earned outstanding grades. This is the result of thorough preliminary training.

This training was performed under the direction of experienced instructors more productively than before. Previously both the first class pilot who had performed such a mission many times and the young officer worked the same amount of time on the simulator. Now the simulator practice of the lieutenants has become longer and the flight assignment is worked both as a complex and by elements.

A more exacting attitude began to be shown in the squadron toward the schooling of experienced aviators as well, who are a majority in the collective. In order to confirm his high qualification, it is sufficient for a first class military pilot to have an average grade in combat employment as part of a flight of four, in addition to landings in difficult weather conditions. It is not very difficult for capable aerial fighting men to fulfill these requirements, and so they become complacent and cease to work at full force. In order to generate their desire for further improvement, in determining winners we began to consider literally all indicators. Objective monitoring material is supplemented by an analysis of the slightest errors in flying techniques, in tactical training and so on.

For example, when first class military pilots captains V. Atrashonok, N. Goryayev and V. Kononenko and Sr Lt N. Morin performed aerial combat in the clouds it became clear that all of them had coped excellently with the task. But which of them was the competition winner? "Cleanness" of flying was taken as the main criterion, for no matter how rigid the norms, they have certain tolerances. For example, in performing one of the maneuvers, the deviation from the given altitude must not exceed so many meters. Some of the pilots adhere to this parameter strictly, without the slightest deviation, while the altitude wanders, so to speak, for another, albeit within tolerable limits. Capt Atrashonok maintained all flight parameters most precisely and he was the subject of an express leaflet and presented the pennant "Best in the Flight Section."

This approach permits a stricter determination of the true level of officer training and prompts them to work with full force and achieve higher quality in working each task.

Flight critiques also became more objective and instructive for the competitors. When some inaccuracy in flying technique is being analyzed, a tape recording is played back on the spot with the flight controller's critical remarks, and

objective monitoring materials are displayed on a large screen. The graphic effect of results is apparent.

The squadron party organization headed by 1st Class military pilot Maj Ye. Tsygankov shows great concern for increasing the effectiveness of socialist competition in the final phase of winter training. Party activists skillfully propagandize foremost experience. A special display is arranged during flight operations in which objective monitoring materials and grades for each advanced element are placed alongside the pilots' photographs. The squadron does not forget to use visual agitation means to reflect achievements of engineering-technical personnel. For example, the diligence of Engr-Maj I. Karyy, Sr Lt Tech Serv A. Voytov, WO S. Pavlin and other aviation specialists was noted in preparing the missile-armed aircraft for flying.

The squadron aviators' successes in combat improvement are especially perceptible now, at the finale of winter training.

New Pilot Training Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Ponomarev, squadron commander, 1st Class military pilot, Red Banner Far East Military District: "Reserves in the Methodology"]

[Text] In the final inspection the aviators of our outstanding squadron demonstrated increased aerial schooling. The competition in honor of the 26th party congress and unanimous support of its resolutions generated a new upsurge of strength and energy in the people. We fulfilled our pledges.

But just what lessons and conclusions did we draw for ourselves in order to reinforce what had been achieved and attain even higher indicators in improving aerial schooling? We became convinced from our own experience of the need both for precise planning of operational training missions and for purposeful organizational work in mobilizing the personnel's efforts in struggling for unconditional fulfillment of plans.

Someone possibly will say here that no matter how flexible and well-conceived a plan may be, life still will make corrections to it. I agree that it is impossible to foresee everything, and we had to make many corrections, above all, in training methodology. Pilots in the flight commanded by Sr Lt A. Polyakov had to practice group flying. As much time as prescribed and no more was set aside for performing this mission, but from the very first days the young aviators encountered many difficulties. During flying in a column of pairs, Sr Lt A. Polyakov and his wingman, Sr Lt A. Chigorenko, got into the flow of other aircraft in the process of combat maneuvering and formation was disrupted. What should be done to correct such mistakes? Plan additional exercises in the air or place emphasis on classes and practice sessions on the ground?

We chose the second path, inasmuch as it is more economical, assuring a saving of costly supplies, and at the same time permitting us to keep up tempos and quality in carrying out the flight plan. We tried to conduct classes and practice sessions in a spirit of competitiveness and recognized each success by a trainee. This produced a rather good result.

Life itself and flying practice also convinces us that a thorough analysis and imaginative exploration of best techniques and methods of training help in the successful accomplishment of a particular operational training mission covered by the flight plan. One time things did not go well for us with assembly of flights into combat formation after take-off. No matter what we tried, we did not keep within the norm. We had to turn to calculations together. We worked out several variants for assembling and prepared diagrams for each one. Then we tested all calculations in the air, choosing the most optimum variant, which we adopted. The aviators mastered it to perfection in competing for best fulfillment of norms.

For purposes of intensifying the training process we also make active use of the method of integrating assignments with the practice of several exercises in one flight. This permits improving the aviators' aerial schooling effectively in compressed periods of time. But what did we notice at times? Some pilots in the flight commanded by Capt A. Zhuravskiy began to lose skills in handling the optical sight.

We had to make corrections to the plan in the course of training. We also began to integrate flight assignments more thoughtfully. We planned bombing exercises using the optical sight along with practice in group flying. Such flights usually were held against a tactical background, with active "enemy" opposition and making a run on the target from different directions.

In fulfilling resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, squadron personnel are working with combat intensity and are stepping up efforts in the struggle for expert mastery of equipment and weapons. Party members are setting the example. Concerned with effectiveness of competition, the party organization makes wide use of publicity and comparability of results, and disseminates foremost experience in personnel training and indoctrination in every possible way.

Regulations in Military Life

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 May 81 p 2

[Article by Lt Col I. Ignatenko, chief of staff of Aviation Regiment "X": "Regulations--Law of Military Life: Our Special Concern"]

[Text] One probably will not meet an officer--commander or political worker, chief of staff or military engineer--who does not understand the importance of regulation order in the daily life and activities of the troops. In the final account it contributes to keeping combat readiness at the requisite level. And now, when we are carefully analyzing results of winter training, we arrive at the indisputable conclusion: The results of combat and political training and fulfillment of socialist pledges are higher in those subunits where Army life is arranged in precise conformity with provisions of combined-arms regulations. Without this, violations of the precise rhythm of the training and indoctrination process and military discipline, and other negative phenomena are inevitable. I recall the following incident.

At one time we began to notice the untidy external appearance of privates and NCO's of the squadron commanded by Maj V. Baskakov. In a subunit formation one could see individual servicemen in untidy dress and with undercollars requiring

washing. Some squadron privates had not been conspicuous for punctuality in observing regulation requirements even before, and the subunit had been criticized more than once for deficiencies in internal order. The squadron commander himself, his political deputy Lt Col N. Berezovskiy and chief of staff Maj V. Korolev were at fault here above all. Realizing the importance of regulation order in strengthening discipline, at the same time they did not display proper exactingness toward flight commanders or team chiefs and relaxed supervision over their work. Then some of the officers ceased to look in on the barracks to see how their subordinates were living and whether or not they were observing regulation order.

The opinion unfortunately exists in some of the officers that only the subunit first sergeant is responsible for the status of internal order in the barracks and for questions of everyday routine of service personnel. In some places there is no supervision of these appointed persons, and as a result some first sergeants regard their assigned job without a proper sense of responsibility. Something of the sort occurred in the aforementioned squadron. Subunit first sergeant WO I. Gavris' once did not issue soap to the personnel at the prescribed time. Although drawn from the depot on time, it lay in the property storage room. "I didn't have time to issue it," said the first sergeant, trying to make excuses. It was of course not just for this reason. Taking advantage of lack of supervision on the commander's part, the warrant officer ceased to show genuine concern for the people and for punctual fulfillment of his official duties.

Such matters are resolved in a very different manner in the outstanding TECh [technical maintenance unit] headed by Maj V. Gadyatskiy. A genuine struggle is carried on here for firm regulation order. All diverse forms and methods are used for these purposes. In particular, correspondence has been arranged with the soldiers' parents. Learning of their sons' successes from the commanders' reports, the fathers and mothers address the privates with their instructions and parting words and express confidence that all conditions have been created for conscientious service in the Army. And this is so. Thanks to steadfast concern by the party and government, our personnel are fully provided with all necessary kinds of allowances. Good-quality clothing and comfortable barracks, excellent food, skilled medical services and favorable conditions for cultural leisure... All this is so. It is a job for the subunit and unit to manage these things intelligently. This is possible only with steadfast concern by commanders and supervisors for subordinates' everyday routine and with persistent struggle for imposing regulation order.

The foremost squadron commanded by Lt Col V. Novak achieved a great deal on this score. It is sufficient to drop in at the privates' barracks, meet a subunit formation on the street or see specialists at work, and one immediately concludes: Yes, here all events are subordinate to regulation, military discipline is firm and the personnel's schooling is high. This is so. All pilots in the squadron are 1st Class specialists, and the technicians and mechanics are experts in their jobs. The personnel perform duties on the daily detail in exemplary fashion and the daily routine is an immutable law for them. In short, the aviators have learned to synchronize their every step with regulation requirements.

Of course, this understanding of the importance of strict Army order in daily life did not come to the personnel of itself. Lt Col Novak capably relies on the staff and squadron party organization in his work and arranged troop duties precisely. Once he began to receive signals about an infraction of the daily routine by some personnel. He had to cut short such deviations from the regulation decisively. As was the custom, he consulted with his deputies, political worker Maj V. Smol'yaninov, and chief of staff Maj R. Glushenko. Together they outlined a number of steps to reinforce supervision over fulfillment of the daily routine and to increase the effectiveness of indoctrinational work. The squadron commander also recommended that party organization secretary Sr Lt A. Yelizarov take up the burning issue at a party meeting.

It soon was held. Party Member Novak gave a briefing about the vanguard role of party members in ensuring exemplary regulation order. All this together contributed to a situation where the officers, warrant officers and NCO's began to take a more conscientious attitude toward fulfillment of their obligations and arrange individual indoctrinational work with people more objectively. And it is not at all by chance that now 1st Squadron personnel differ favorably from others by their composure, smart appearance, and vigilant performance of service on the daily detail. Even their external appearance draws attention. Previously clothing was selected for the privates and NCO's according to the size they gave. Now it is fitted on each person right at the clothing depot. Though more time is spent on this, the soldiers have a dashing, neat appearance.

The squadron commanded by Lt Col Novak is an outstanding one. Such indicators naturally became possible thanks to capably arranged socialist competition in the subunit and well organized indoctrinational work with the people. The commander also rightly believes that precise rhythm and effectiveness of combat training, firm military discipline and strict regulation order would have been impossible without well arranged troop duties.

We always set the ability of right-flankers of competition to organize it well as an example for the other squadrons. The commander always has in front of him a complete picture of the life of subunits and knows here established order meets all requirements and where there are deviations from it and why. The staff has arranged strict supervision on this score over fulfillment of the daily routine, performance of duties by the daily detail and the progress of classes. In other words, the staff officers always have a clear picture of the state of affairs in subunits. The information coming from them permits us to react promptly to negative phenomena, prevent them, and see that the regiment's life meets regulation requirements.

Let's say that it was learned at the beginning of winter that the temperature did not conform to regulation temperature and was below that prescribed in some of the housing. It goes without saying that it is uncomfortable in a cold barracks and one cannot rest properly under such conditions. We looked carefully into the reason and soon fully replaced pipes in the heating system. It became warm in the soldiers' housing and the people's mood elevated along with it.

Of course we also have certain problems and tasks. For example, one does not always see proper order in the mess hall during a meal. There still are infractions of the regulation by persons on the daily detail, and there are other shortcomings as well. Some of them are explained by unsatisfactory work of the

subunit first sergeants. Not all of them unfortunately yet have become genuine supervisors of the NCO's and privates or zealous managers. In selecting first sergeants, some subunit commanders apparently are not able to evaluate their job qualities and later do not give proper attention to their indoctrination.

The time is not far off when, having adopted all the best achieved during the winter months, as they say, we will struggle to achieve new goals in the summer training period. Even now the staff is doing everything to generalize foremost experience in organizing troop duties and to subordinate it to an increase in combat readiness and successful fulfillment of pledges in socialist competition.

Educational Role of Services Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 May 81 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Pozdnyakov, assistant chief for Komsomol work of political directorate of Air Defense Forces: "Indoctrinational Role of the Soviet Armed Forces: Take a Hero as an Example"]

[Text] The flight took place in a difficult situation. Sr Lt V. Larin cast a glance at the instruments: Everything was normal. Suddenly the aircraft shuddered and the rpm began to drop. "A lightning discharge," flashed the guess. The situation became critical. The pilot received authorization to abandon the aircraft, but he seemingly did the impossible and saved the missile-armed plane...

A soldier became seriously ill in winter at a high-mountain site. There was a blizzard and there could be no thought of a helicopter. Capt A. Kovalev knew that there was just one chance to save the person--to make their way to the valley through the snowstorm. The commander announced before the formation: "Volunteers will take the patient." The entire formation stepped forward. The most experienced persons were selected and a few hours later, which seemed an eternity, the weakened volunteers delivered their comrade to the hospital...

These and other vivid examples of courage and initiative are well known in the Air Defense Forces. Young soldiers speak with excitement about them at meetings, topical evenings, debates and lessons of courage. Contact with heroic deeds generates elevated feelings in the heart and utmost respect for the people who performed them. For you will agree that one has to have not just excellent professional training, knowledge and experience, but also enviable self-control and boldness not to waver in a difficult situation while saving people and equipment.

Young people often ask the question: Just where are the sources of remarkable qualities which, for example, distinguished the aforementioned interceptor pilot and the radar personnel? There is one answer here: These qualities have been acquired in strenuous combat training and polished by the entire tenor of Army life and the purposeful work of commanders, and party and Komsomol organizations. Service among our troops is a special kind of service involving the constant performance of operational readiness. This is why it is necessary to develop a communist awareness and a desire to accomplish an assigned mission in exemplary fashion in the personnel with all the force of ideological influence.

An exploit begins with a clear understanding by each soldier of his personal responsibility for the homeland's safety, and with professional and moral maturity and an active position in life. It can be said with confidence that a majority of Komsomol organizations which capably indoctrinate the Army youth in the heroic traditions of units and subunits gain truly invaluable experience. Imaginative exploration and initiative distinguish the work of the Komsomol organization headed by Sr Lt S. Shchekin. The activists are able to generate in colleagues a heightened interest in events of the past war and the desire to take a hero as an example, using an interesting lecture, frontline photograph or an exciting narrative prior to a tactical exercise. The personnel have good knowledge of the exploit by Lt G. Volnyanskiy and his fighting men. In fighting at Tula in 1941 fascist tanks fell on our firing positions several times and immediately rolled back. The steadfastness of our air defense personnel knew no bounds. The Hitlerites lost 14 tanks in combat, but did not advance a single step.

Young people proudly mention the names of frontlinesmen whose models of utter service to the Motherland beckon to the heights of military valor. Yes, the activists found a sure path to propaganda of countrymen's heroic deeds. Komsomol cards are handed out in the combat glory room before unfurled colors. Armed Forces veterans and the best personnel of foremost subunits are invited to open Komsomol meetings. The ritual of presenting weapons and combat equipment to young replacements is strict and ceremonial...

The destinies of heroes who abound in the history of the Air Defense Forces have become bright beacons for personnel of the unit where Sr Lt A. Gulin is Komsomol organization secretary. The Komsomol committee is an active assistant of the commander and party organization in indoctrination work. "Frontlinesmen, Our Countrymen, Speak"--a radio newspaper is put out regularly under that rubric. Veterans' letters are read during tactical exercises.

The units in question have held foremost positions in combat training and in competition for a long while now. It stands to reason that many factors led to this success. Well-arranged propaganda of combat traditions also played its part. The fact is that contact with an exploit gives rise to inspiration and generates in soldiers a desire to augment the glory of their fathers.

It would be possible to name many more places where they are able to bring the breath of fiery years and the grandeur of the exploits of the Motherland's defenders to every person and where they spare no effort or enthusiasm to make military service a really remarkable school of labor and military schooling, courage, patriotism and comradeship for the young people. But at times one encounters facts of another sort. In some places the work of Komsomol organizations bears the nature of a campaign and becomes animated only for jubilees and holidays. Recently I had occasion to visit Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment "K." It has a grand history: It fought its way from Stalingrad to Berlin and there are several orders on the colors. There also is a good combat glory room here with many exhibits. But what is disturbing is that the young soldiers with whom I had occasion to chat have very superficial ideas about the unit's combat path and do not know frontline traditions. What is the reason? In brief, it lies in that easy approach by Sr Lt P. Mel'nikov, Komsomol organization secretary and other activists to an important job. They often substitute simple paperwork for

lively, imaginative work with people. It is impossible to reconcile oneself with such a situation.

Another substantial mistake, in my view, also is discovered at times. I recall a meeting with Capt M. Kuznetsov. The officer told enthusiastically about the strenuous training routine and valuable initiatives by participants of the All-Union Lenin Quiz, and he named the names of those of whom the collective was proud. But when the talk turned to unit history, he sighed:

"You see, the unit did not take part in fighting. There is nothing of which to boast..."

One hardly can agree with this opinion. On becoming familiar with the regiment's life and combat training, one sees how, from year to year, receiving the spiritual heritage of older generations, soldiers master the most sophisticated technical systems in short periods of time and display heightened ideological conviction and moral beauty in their patriotic initiatives. I will venture to use high-sounding words in saying that these are the true heroes of strenuous military routine, whose deeds and acts are worthy of praise and ringing songs. Reminiscences of a unit veteran recorded on tape, old, time-yellowed wall newspapers, operational newssheets, diaries of soldier's glory, and Komsomol bulletins--these and other materials can and must become a good support in the capable, caring hands of Komsomol activists in propagandizing traditions and in instilling pride for their regiment in those who recently joined the combat formation.

And I would like to mention one other important point. In conversations with Komsomol workers, one hears now and then a frank complaint that it is becoming more and more difficult to arrange a meeting with frontlinesmen and borrow on the combat experience gained in the war. Well, time takes its toll and the ranks of veterans are thinning. We must be even more persistent and energetic in adopting their invaluable experience and combat traditions. Unfortunately, far from all reserves are being used by Komsomol committees and bureaus. Great Patriotic War participants sometimes travel to the unit to meet a son or grandson. They always can be distinguished from other visitors by the medal ribbon bars on their chests. Whose heart does not beat with excitement in walking alongside a person who fought on the battlefield in bringing the great victory nearer? And how disappointing it sometimes is for Komsomol activists who lose a most promising opportunity to have a frontlinesman speak or to arrange a meeting with an interesting person.

Indoctrination of the youth in the revolutionary and combat traditions of Soviet citizens is a most important part of the work of Komsomol organizations. It must be conducted in such a way that allegiance to Lenin's behests and the heroics of the older generation give the soldiers a new charge of enthusiasm.

In the CPSU CC Report to the 26th party congress given by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev there are remarkable words about today's defenders of the Motherland--the sons and grandsons of Great Patriotic War heroes. Leonid Il'ich said that "they did not go through the stern tests which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers. But they are true to the heroic traditions of our Army and our people."

Komsomol members and all young soldiers of the Air Defense Forces took this high party praise to heart. Accepting the heritage of the frontlinesmen's courage and glory, they are proving their filial devotion to the Motherland by vital military work.

VTA 50th Anniversary Interview

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jun 81 p 3

[Interview of Military Transport Aviation Commander Lt Gen Avn A. N. Volkov: "Heavy Work by Heavy Aircraft"]

> [Text] The landing or dropping of airborne assault forces, delivery of weapons, ammunition and fuel, and the evacuation of wounded--those are the chief missions for crews of the largest and probably most "industrious" aircraft of our Air Force, joined in Military Transport Aviation (VTA). On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the VTA, its commander, Lt Gen A. N. Volkov, answered questions of a PRAVDA correspondent.

[Question] What were the events for which the origin of Military Transport Aviation was noted?

[Answer] The VTA covered a long and, one can say, difficult path, at the beginning of which was the creation of the Experimental Airborne Assault Detachment. Activation of the detachment ended 1 June 1931, and we consider this day the birthday of the VTA.

At that time views were taking shape in Soviet military science on a new form of aviation's combat employment as an assault transport means. The Soviet aviation industry had begun to supply the Air Force with heavy aviation equipment. In short, theoretical and practical preconditions permitted us to shift to planned, purposeful work of forming air assault units.

The Experimental Air Assault Detachment activated by decree of the USSR Revvoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council] became the first and at that time only unit with an air transport and airborne assault mission in the world's armed forces. The detachment had two squadrons--one with 12 TB-1 aircraft and the other with 10 R-5 aircraft, and some 300 persons in air crews and technical personnel.

There were 550 parachute drops made in a short time, including drops of groups consisting of 10 or more persons. The jumps were made during the day or night, on unfamiliar zones and on the water. There also were five assault landings during military district exercises.

After summarizing results of the detachment's work, the USSR Revvoyensovet decided to move on to extensive organizational development of similar units, which resulted in the creation of the modern-day military transport aviation.

[Question] The day of the first salvos of the Great Patriotic War soon will be 40 years distant. What milestones mark the actions of transport aviation in those stern years?

[Answer] In the 1,418 days and nights aviators of the Air Force transport aviation units flew some 1.7 million aircraft-sorties in the zone of combat operations alone. Transport aviation pilots took part in battles and engagements from Moscow to Berlin. The missions they performed were of exceptional importance. Twice operational-tactical assault landings were made in the inte-ests of front troops by decision of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command: in 1942 in the vicinity of Vyaz'ma-Dorogobuzh and in 1943 in liberating the Right-Bank Ukraine in the vicinity of Velikiy Bukrin. Tactical assaults by parachute and by landing also were held, and especially often in the Far East during the war against Japan.

It is of course necessary to note the interaction of air transport units with the partisans. More than 109,000 aircraft-sorties were flown across the front line into the deep enemy rear, with 13,000 of them involving a landing on partisan strips. This was a true air bridge from the "Big Land" to the people's avengers. Entire aviation regiments were used to perform such missions. Each flight to the partisans as well as flights for assault landings required supreme professional ability of the crews and courage without question. Soviet air transport units also gave extensive assistance to participants of the liberation struggle in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria and a number of other countries.

Air transport units made flights into blockaded and besieged cities: Leningrad, Sevastopol' and Odessa. The enemy tried to destroy the transport aircraft in the air and bombed airfields where they were to land. But the aviators took off again and again several times a day.

Air shipments of supplies to various fronts were practically a daily occurrence. Operational movement of combined units of the ground forces and front aviation also were accomplished. The crews of air transport units carried hundreds of thousands of tons of weapons, ammunition, fuel and other military cargoes and hund eds of thousands of officers and men.

Pilots of air transport units have something of which to be proud. The Motherland highly esteemed their contribution to the enemy's defeat and to attainment of the great victory. Airship commander Sr Lt S. Frolovskiy, captains B. Kalinkin, G. Taran and P. Yakimov, Maj A. Shornikov and many others became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Several thousand aviators were decorated with USSR orders and medals. A number of units were awarded guards titles and honorary designations. Almost all units were decorated with orders.

[Question] During the 36 postwar years major transformations have taken place in the Soviet Armed Forces. How has the VTA changed?

[Answer] VTA personnel are true to traditions of wartime heroes and they multiply them in today's daily service, which also is difficult.

The present-day appearance of Military Transport Aviation differs substantially from that of past years, and the performance characteristics are different. In the Dvina exercises 8,000 parachutists were landed with weapons and combat equipment in 22 minutes. Now even this is no longer the limit for us. The VTA has become a jet, all-weather, autonomous element, the cargo capacity of airships has risen and flight range has increased.

The An-12, An-22 and Il-76 military transport aircraft have outstanding flight characteristics and reliable flying, sighting, navigational, assault landing and transport cargo handling equipment. Great credit goes to well-known designers O. K. Antonov, S. V. Il'yushin and G. V. Novozhilov for creation of this first-rate aviation technology.

An increase in technical outfitting expanded the capabilities for employing the VTA and at the same time had a serious effect on the nature of its missions. They have to be carried out at any time of day, in any kind of weather, in limited periods of time and over all distances. The geography of flight operations has expanded greatly: from the Arctic to the deserts of Central Asia, from the Baltic to the Pacific.

Moreover, the VTA often encounters so-called special and unscheduled missions caused by unforeseen reasons. Much was done by crews commanded by Officer V. Mikhaylov and 1st Class military pilots N. Zaytsev and M. Kuznetsov. In performing assignments, the personnel of these subunits demonstrated high professional schooling and the ability to operate under difficult conditions.

[Question] Military-technical changes obviously have increased demands on the personnel and their training.

[Answer] Nonstop flights of many hours, routes of thousands of kilometers and flights at different times of day, often under conditions of the polar night, over high-mountain or desert terrain, or over water areas of seas and oceans; flights to all remote areas of our Motherland; and landings on dirt and snow-covered strips--this is a far from complete description of conditions under which pilots serve in Military Transport Aviation.

Thanks to the Communist Party's concern we have good, combat-ready flight personnel whose high professional, political, moral and ethical qualities have been tested more than once under actual, responsible flights. And the aviators always performed their duty.

A majority of officers among the flight and engineering personnel have a higher education. The Balashov and Voroshilovgrad aviation schools give us pilots and engineer-navigators. Good replacements come to us from military academies. As a rule, these officers served previously in VTA units and know their specific nature.

We give a central spot in working with cadres to the airship commander. He is the chief figure for the VTA. Our commanders are excellently trained and another valuable point is that some of them have 5,000 or more flying hours. These make up our winged guard. Officers A. Bykov and T. Shevchenko, who have flown 10,000 hours and have performed hundreds of difficult flights, are the right-flankers in it.

The aviators' air and tactical schooling and ability to ready equipment for faultless operation under maximum working conditions were tested in major troop exercises. Dnepr, Yug, Kavkaz, Neman and Berezina; and in joint exercises of Warsaw Pact armies Shield and Brotherhood in Arms. VTA crews performed the mission with outstanding or good grades in all these exercises and received commendations from the USSR Minister of Defense and his deputies. A number of VTA units were awarded the pennant "For Courage and Military Valor."

Party-political work actively contributes to the successful accomplishment of missions facing the VTA. Political workers of air units and subunits themselves are pilots and navigators of high qualification who personally perform the most responsible and difficult flights. Officers F. Mishin, Ye. Kuz'min and many others enjoy deserved authority in our aviation. Party groups have been formed in airship crews.

Today the chief efforts of commanders, political entities, and party and Komsomol organizations are aimed at implementing resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress. Socialist competition has unfolded among the personnel: "For high combat readiness and firm military order." Foremost collectives are widely known in the units. Among them is the subunit where 1st Class military pilot V. Sidorenko, delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress, serves.

I say with pride that more than 20 of our aviators have been awarded honorary titles of honored military pilots and navigators of the USSR. A large group of VTA flight and technical engineering personnel have been decorated with orders and medals in recent years.

Personnel of Military Transport Aviation--a component part of our grand Air Force--are responding with their work to the party and government's concern. The aviators have a deep understanding of their duty and always are ready to fulfill their sacred duty of defending our Motherland and its socialist allies.

Military Air Transport Functions

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jun 81 p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA special correspondent N. Sautin: "Marathon in the Sky: Five Days Aboard a Military Transport Aircraft"]

> [Text] The Air Force Military Transport Aviation is 50 years old. A majority of VTA [Military Transport Aviation] pilots are celebrating the jubilee at their customary work station--in the sky...

The rocket muscles tear the aircraft from its place and carry it with a deafening roar along the concrete and shove it into the sky. I managed to notice a group of operators on the green shoulder of the field. The people at the camera are wearing the uniform of Air Force officers. The film they shot later will be shown to young pilots as a model of delicate take-off techniques.

The heavy-cargo Il lifts its nose and climbs confidently upward. Maj P. Yefimov is at the controls. He has mastered this aircraft, a new type for him, to perfection. Prior to the flight Petr Alekseyevich Yefimov praised the aircraft:

"It can move tanks, missiles, air defense mounts, infantry fighting vehicles and airborne fighting vehicles long distances. It can strew half the sky with parachutists in one run. The comfortable, pressurized cargo compartment is used for evacuating the wounded and sick. The aircraft needs but a short take-off strip for its take-off run. It turns on an area a bit larger than its wing span. An interaircraft navigation system and a sight-navigational system are installed in the aircraft. It proved itself excellently under all weather and tactical conditions."

Yefimov is sitting in the left-hand seat, the airship commander's place. He confidently controls the aircraft as if on a thread with barely noticeable movements of hands in black gloves. Before him are the instrument panels. Only a small segment of the blue sky can be seen through the glassed slit of the cowling, which girdles the top of the cockpit in a semicircle. The pilot flies that way across the entire country without seeing anything except dials and scales.

Yefimov is a 1st Class pilot. The major has handled the controls of the Yak-18, Li-2, Il-12 and Il-14. He has landed parachutists in the largest exercises aboard the An-12. More than once he has made nonstop flights of many hours. His military work has been recognized by nine governmental awards, among them the Order of Red Banner and Order of Red Star. To receive them in peacetime is a high honor for a Soviet officer.

Our airship is flying at an altitude greater than 10,000 m. There is not a cloud in the sky. Cities, rivers and forests nestled on the visible convexity of the globe can be seen for hundreds of kilometers as if from space. We are to fly and fly, crossing meridians and time zones, to the drowsy drone of the turbines, tossing the sun like a little ball first to starboard then to port. The aircraft's shadow will slip over the black earth of plowed fields and over the yellow scorching sands of desert, over the icy brows of mountain peaks and over the boundless taiga, but we will perceive this movement from the counter showing decreasing fuel and from the voices of those who, replacing each other, help us from below in keeping to the invisible reference points--the radio beacons.

Next to the commander is the copilot. In the Air Force he is called the right-hand pilot. His work station is a copy of the commander's. They control the airship in turn on long flights. The copilot, Sr Lt Nikolay Voronin, is 25 years old. Four years ago he arrived in the unit after higher school. He liked the regiment. The pilots firmly preserve the frontline traditions of veterans who at one time fought in the Li-2 in the sky of Bobruysk, Riga, Koenigsberg and Berlin. They were cordial toward the new arrival, but demanded an accounting for flight schooling with all strictness. Voronin managed to fly more than 700 hours. He is one of those who since childhood yearned for the sky. This is understandable. His uncle is a pilot, one brother flies an An-12 and another flies a supersonic Mig.

Between the pilots is a squat pedestal with four levers which are shifted by the senior flight technician, Nikolay Starshinov, a 1st Class specialist and instructor. If he moves a lever away from himself, the turbine breaks down from its own power. If he pulls it backward, the roar is calm and pacified. That is how speed is set on the aircraft. Starshinov is a Siberian. When he flies over Irkutskaya Oblast, it always seems to him that the aircraft is moving forward

much too fast and it should be necessary to reduce the rpm. But alas, you won't hover over your native village in our cumbersome aircraft...

The fourth crew member is radio operator WO Vasiliy Shunder. A laconic person from Pskov, he seeks out his subscribers in the anthill of the airwaves with the persistence of a gold prospector. He can contact any point in the country from here, from the clouds.

As we approach the Urals, the sun apparently has decided to set in our cockpit. The commander draws the velvety cockpit hoods. The instrument panels gleam like small coals in the cozy semidarkness. The pilots lean back in their seats and the controls themselves dance a slow step synchronously -the autopilot has been switched on.

I descend to the "first floor" down a steep ladder to the navigator's compartment. He is sitting in the transparent tip of the aircraft nose. A glassy abyss is beneath his feet. One sees the earth float beneath as in a rather eerie sleep. Such a sight is inaccessible for the Aeroflot passenger. It seems that not the aircraft, but you yourself are soaring like a bird on the resilient flows with unbelievable speed...

Rocking its wings, the aircraft makes a turn. The navigator presses the intercom pedal and reports the coordinates of our location to the commander. Capt Leonid Alpeyev, 32 years old, has more than 3,000 flying hours. He arrived in aviation from underground in the literal sense of the word: He was mining coal in the "Zaporozh'ye" Komsomol Shaft. The first on the right in the row of medal ribbon bars is the Order of Red Banner...

Alpeyev sits at the console and inputs flight data: coordinates, time to the turn, wind at altitude, and distance to target. Later the aircraft will fly automatically from these data. Transporting cargoes is a portion of the navigator's bustling work, and far from the most difficult. But when you land personnel...

"My mission," says Alpeyev, "is to take the parachutists to the designated zone and give the command to switch on the 'Jump!' sign exactly over the assault landing area. It is a matter of seconds and meters here. We recently dropped platforms with fighting vehicles in an exercise. The crew earned a grade of 'outstanding'."

Our aircraft has been heading east for so many hours now. The sun is strolling somewhere far behind, over Europe. We first force our way in the milky clouds, then plunge into the piercing blue. The lighted stars scatter under the fuselage. One doesn't sense the voices of the turbines, having become used to them. It seems you are wandering alone through the silence of the sky.

When the "air speedometer" has turned thousands of kilometers, we head in for a landing. We have delivered a very peaceful load to this military post on the country's Far Eastern borders, lost among the mountains: steam heating radiators, pipes, construction materials, telephone cables and telephone sets.

The command post issues Maj Yefimov the next assignment: to take engineer equipment aboard. The course is for Central Asia. The copilot, navigator and radio operator hasten to plot the shortest route on the map and study the radio and air navigation situation and safe altitudes en route.

We drive to the airfield with Capt Petr Kapsalyamov, flight technician for airborne assault equipment. Kapsalyamov is in charge of the cargo compartment. Tracked vehicles growl near the aircraft. They drive into the gaping aircraft along the ramp directly from the pad. Bulldozer blades lifted by hoists crawling along rails on the cockpit ceiling are stacked along the sides. The aircraft winch also drags a container with spare parts inside.

Again we hear in the earphones:

"Radio operator? Ready! Flight technician? Ready! Navigator? Ready!.. Take-off authorized!.."

We receive a storm warning by radio halfway along the route. Soon we see a solid gray mass stopping up the sky--we can't go around it. The aircraft radar suggests a passage. We set the necessary course, but the wind blows and closes the hole. Maj Yefimov makes his decision to continue the flight. The crew is calm. It is apparent that this is a sober calculation and not a daring "perhaps." The aircraft forces its way in the viscous fog. You wait for the turbines to choke on a piece of this dense material or for lightning to crackle along the fuselage. The hand involuntarily caresses the parachute. When a sunbeam hit the glass, I sighed in relief, as apparently did the aircraft as well.

After another hour of flying you realize that it is too early to rejoice. Mountain peaks pierce the clouds. The sensation is that if we go a bit lower, icy helmets will rip open the bottom. After crossing the next ridge, we dart onto a vast plateau. The violence of emerald green irritates the eye.

We "sun ourselves" for a day at a local airfield: unloading, resting and plotting new route on the map. There are more than enough maps in the navigator's black briefcase. The military pilot's path does not lay over a well-worn route.

"We will take a large-size cargo to the North," says the commander.

The aircraft takes a long take-off run, ripping open the red-hot haze with its heavy body, but we were able to get the broad wings to rest on the shaky, rarefied air only after running to the end of the take-off strip. The aircraft lifts off into a gorge, hovers for a second and soars upward steeply.

And again there are mountains, sandy, mirror-like surfaces, cultivated steppe and taiga under the wings. We observe a carousel of climatic zones for the umpteenth time during the marathon in the sky.

I go to the cargo compartment. It is pressurized like the pilot's cockpit. Outside it is minus 60, but here any temperature is set by the click of a switch. I drink green tea while sucking chocolate from the flight ration with Kapsalyamov at a telescopic table and discuss the situation of our seventh crew member, gunner Volodya Mikhaylov. He sits in a little transparent cockpit right under the

tailfin and has contact with us over the intercom. That is how he contemplates the earth in his proud solitude. But without him our aircraft would be a defenseless carrier and not a military red star aircraft. At one time Mikhaylov performed first-term service in naval artillery. Even now the warrant officer is in his element: He plows the expanses of the fifth ocean.

We head in for a landing late at night. The aircraft wheels have difficulty clinging to the icy crust of the strip--late frosts were experienced here. Kapsalyamov opens the side door. The wind is such that you only have to lay down in it and it will hold you up. The persons greeting us are wearing fur jackets. The pilots' hotel is ten paces from the KPP [traffic checkpoint]. Someone already has stretched a rope, foreseeing the wind of hurricane force. We reach the night's lodging by clinging to it. They say of such places that June here is not yet summer, and July is no longer summer... The cargo consignee arrived the following day. He shook the crew's hands a long while: The navigation period by water is brief and all hopes are on the air bridge.

That evening, driven by a following wind, we went to catch up with the setting sun. Our course was for home. Behind lay thousands of kilometers, tens of hours in the air and almost 150 tons of urgent cargoes moved from end to end of the country. This is routine work for crews of the Air Force VTA.

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CSO: 1801/271

MARCH TRAINING OF MOTORIZED INFANTRY BATTALION DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 81 pp 21-22

[Article by Lt Col V. Naryshkin: "Battalion March"]

[Text]

A march is an organized movement of troops in columns on roads and improvised routes for the purpose of reaching designated area or assigned line. March training has been always considered one of the most important indicators of units' and subunits' readiness for carrying out combat actions. In conditions of contemporary battle characterized by dynamism, fluidity, sharp changes in the situation, situations may frequently arise when the troops have to perform long marches to carry out the assigned mission. This is not only a demand of the time but also a natural result of the further improvement of combat training, the constant perfecting of equipment and its increased possibilities.

A Mtz Inf (tank) Bn carries out a march independently in one column (in advance guard, advanced detachment) or as a part of the main body of a regiment, moving at the head or at the tail of the column, as a rule by night or in conditions of limited visibility during combat actions and deep in the rear of friendly forces also by day. A march may or may not be carried out in anticipation of an encounter with the enemy.

Whatever the conditions, subunits must arrive at the appointed area on time and in full combat readiness. The time factor plays an important role in the fulfillment of a mission. The extremely short time available for organizing and carrying out a march creates prerequisites for forestalling the enemy in reaching the appointed line and consolidating on it. This in turn makes it possible to carry out all the necessary measures for holding a defence area, organizing the terrain with engineer works and preparing a fire system.

A march is performed and the appointed area reached in full combat readiness as a result of perfect maintenance of the material, its thorough preparation, skilled organization of the march and provision of all the necessary conditions, high level of march training of subunits and the battalion commander's skill.

The experience of advanced subunits shows that the success of a march depends on the use of rational methods of leading columns, with due account, of course, of the conditions of the situation, terrain, climate, time of the day and the year and the use of scientifically-grounded methods of planning and calculating it. At a tactical exercise, for example, a Mtz Inf Bn under Major V. Novikov, detailed as an advanced detachment, was assigned the mission to carry out a many-kilometre march and to forestall the "enemy" in capturing an advantageous line. Let us examine how the battalion CO organized his work.

After specifying the mission he immediately issued warning orders to the subunit commanders and gave the signal to form columns and begin to move out.

Then, basing himself on the conditions of the route and weather, Major Novikov determined the maximum possible speeds on various sections. By dividing the length of these sections by the average speeds of movement he calculated the time necessary for performing the march. Allowing an hour for a halt, it would take seven hours to fulfil the assigned mission.

In an effort to gain time, the battalion CO made all calculations as quickly as possible. Even before the battalion columns passed the initial point, the chief of staff handed over written operation instructions to subunit commanders containing a timing of the march on standard forms (Fig. 1).

An advance party comprising a Mtz Inf Coy reinforced with a mortar battery and an antitank platoon was sent forward for protection.

The battalion column was followed by a technical train.

A distance of 30-35 m was maintained between subunits and vehicles. When moving at higher speeds, on steep

Fig. 1. Decision of 2nd Mtz Inf Bn CO for a march



climbs and descents it was increased to 50 m. The vehicles moved using the blackout facilities and night vision devices.

The battalion CO moved at the head of the column. Control was exercised by the established signals. Radio silence was observed. Subunits moved with strict observation of all safety measures.

At a halt called after three hours of movement besides a meal and rest being taken, the condition of vehicles was checked and they were refuelled, reconnaissance data was brought to the knowledge of subunit commanders, the battalion CO specified missions for subunit commanders and the mode of action in case of an unexpected engagement with the "enemy."



Fig. 2. Sector for improving subunit march training standard

At the halt the formation of columns was not broken. The vehicles stopped at least 10 m one from another on the right side of the road. In them were observers and machine gunners. Besides, in the commanders' vehicles there was constant listening in on the given radio frequency.

After the halt, the march continued. Acting in the advanced detachment the MSr bn, reinforced with an artillery battalion, occupied the indicated line in good time, considerably forestalling the "enemy."

When the exercise was over, Major Novikov said how a high marching standard of the personnel had been achieved. At tactical briefings the officers performed missions relating to calculating and planning a march, there were periods of instruction, method and demonstration lessons on the rules of driving in complicated conditions. By Major Novikov's instructions the battalion staff worked out in advance different variants of route formation and determined the signals by which subunits quickly took their places in the column.

To speed up the march calculation the component account norms tables were drawn and standard forms were prepared. Such thorough preparatory work made it possible to considerably reduce the time for organising the march.

Great attention was also paid to raising the march training standard. During the march the hardest tasks fall to the lot of drivers and vehicle commanders. The speed of movement, safety of equipment and, in the final analysis, success of the entire march depend largely on them. Therefore, main attention in the battalion is paid to the march training of this category. The necessary tactical background is created when working out programme exercises in driving vehicles at platoon and company level.

Major Novikov has also worked out an effective method of training the drivers. It boils down to the following. A closed course is organised on the training field (Fig. 2). Its length is slightly more than that of the subunit's march column. The exercise director, provided with hand flags (lamp by night), megaphone and radio, is at the centre of the ring and controls the actions of drivers, vehicle commanders and observers. Every now and then he stops the column, assembles the trainees and makes a brief critique.

Such exercises, besides working up firm skills in the men, make it possible to improve control over the column during the march.

Subsequently the situation is made more complicated. Exercises are carried out by day and by night, in rain and snow, on ice-covered roads. The column moves at increased speeds, negotiating various obstacles. During the march the men receive training in performing commandant's service on a march.

As we see, it is not by chance that the battalion has a high march training standard. The search for rational ways and methods of training, the commander's efforts to use scientifically substantiated methods of calculating and organizing the march have promoted the success of the exercises.

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BOOK REVIEW: 'SOVIET AIRBORNE TROOPS'

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No. 4, Apr 81 pp 52-53

[Book review by Col V. Krylov: "Winged Infantry." Book title transliteration: "Sovetskiye Vozdushno-Desantnyye"]

[Text] The Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defence has put out a book* "Soviet Airborne Troops." This is a military-historical essay about the formation, combat use and development of the Soviet airborne troops and the courage and heroism of Soviet paratroopers during the Great Patriotic War and in peacetime.

The young airborne troops of the Land of Soviets gathered strength and matured quickly to become, by the early 40s, a significant force within the army. In the spring of 1941 the six airborne brigades formed in 1938 were reorganised into five airborne corps, each over 10,000 men strong.

Along with the building-up of airborne units and formations, work was carried out to develop military transport aviation and airborne equipment and to produce parachutes.

Thus, during the prewar years the airborne troops developed at a high rate, acquiring considerable experience in combat training and combat use to become an independent fighting arm within the Soviet Armed Forces.

Many airborne units and subunits engaged the enemy on June 22, 1941 together with the frontier guards. When war broke out, subunits of the 10th Airborne Brigade were carrying out a tactical exercise near the state frontier in the Baltic Region. Finding themselves in the enemy rear, they were ordered to break through to the main friendly forces, destroying mercilessly the penetrated enemy on the way. Going into battle from the march column, the paratroopers destroyed several enemy groups, liberated a number of inhabited localities and then, in cooperation with units of the 27th Army, drove the nazis out of Daugavpils and held it firmly afterwards.

In the western direction the 214th Brigade under Colonel A. Levashov operated most daringly in the enemy rear.

On July 1, Captain Antroshenko's subunit of this brigade was assigned the mission to destroy a large ammunition depot and a fuel base. The paratroopers approached the depot undetected, removed the sentries noiselessly, destroyed the guards and planted mines in the main ammunition room. There were several serviceable automobiles on the territory of the depot, which the paratroopers used to get away. When they were about two kilometres from the depot, a powerful explosion shook the ground, sending high into the air tens of thousands of enemy shells.

The fuel base was blown up too. The paratroopers then approached a former Soviet military cantonment, in whose barracks a nazi punitive detachment was now quartered. Their swift attack did not let a single nazi escape.

On the night of July 18, 1941 paratroopers made a daring raid on the Maryina Gorka railway station, destroying a train with combat equipment and ammunition, and the enemy garrison. The Soviet people and its army, including paratroopers, fought the enemy courageously wherever the Motherland sent them. The book deals at length with their feats of arms.

In January 1942 the Supreme Command GHQ assigned the troops of the western direction the mission to encircle and destroy the army group "Centre" at Rzhev, Vyazma, Yukhnov and Gzhatsk. To complete the encirclement, it was decided to drop the 4th Airborne Corps southwest of Vyazma. The parachuting,

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* V. Margelov, I. Lisov, Ye. Semenikhin. "Soviet Airborne Troops." (A Military-Historical Essay.)

which began late in January, lasted several days, with the paratroopers fighting fierce battles.

Exceptional courage and resolution in those battles were displayed by the airborne battalion under Major Kobets, which was assigned the mission to cut off a railway and a highway west of Vyazma, thereby depriving the enemy of the possibility to transport troops and military cargoes along them.

Without waiting for the entire battalion to assemble, Major Kobets with a 131 men strong detachment made a swift dash to the designated area and straddled both the railway and the highway.

Coming to their senses, the nazis tried to encircle and destroy the paratroopers. Major Kobets' battalion operated in the enemy rear for 21 days, blowing up trains with personnel, materiel and automobiles, destroying nazi crash repair teams sent out to restore the railway which the paratroopers put out of operation eight times. Not a single German train passed along the railway during that time, and on the highway the enemy was forced to carry out transportation under a strong cover of tanks and armoured cars.

In the fighting for Stalingrad an unprecedented feat of arms was performed by a group of paratroopers commanded by Pyotr Bolotov. The enemy hurled a large tank force against the regiment's positions, managing to break through the forward edge. The tanks quickly penetrated into the depth of the defences. Pyotr Bolotov and his comrades camouflaged their trenches thoroughly, let the enemy tanks approach as close as possible and then opened sudden and accurate fire, hitting fifteen tanks with only two antitank rifles. The remaining vehicles turned back.

Paratroopers fought the enemy selflessly on the legendary Small Land. For 225 days they defended the beachhead courageously and later stormed Novorossiisk jointly with the Marines. Referring to them, L. I. Brezhnev said that it is possible to kill a Soviet man, but it is impossible to defeat him.

On the fiery Kursk Bulge paratroopers were in the heat of bloody battles. At the village of Ponyri an enemy infantry force more than a battalion strong opposed the company under N. Kosyakov. The commander raised the company to attack. In a hand-to-hand fighting the paratroopers forced the enemy to withdraw. The company started to pursue him, but lethal machine-gun fire barred its way. Lieutenant Bolshakov, a Komsomol member, rushed at the firing emplacement and covered the embrasure with his body. The company continued to advance and won the battle.

Paratroopers performed quite a few feats of arms in the Battle for the Dnieper, at the concluding stage of the war. The authors stress that the Great Patriotic War was a severe test for the airborne troops, who passed it with honour. During the war nearly three hundred paratroop soldiers, sergeants and officers were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Of great interest to the reader is the section of the book devoted to the postwar airborne troops. Owing to constant solicitude of the Communist Party and the Soviet government they made yet another step in their development.

The authors write that present-day young servicemen are worthy heirs continuing the combat traditions and combat glory of front-line soldiers.

More than once paratroopers demonstrated their high combat training standard during manoeuvres in the postwar period. One such manoeuvre, code-named "Dvina," took place in Byelorussia in the spring of 1970. It was a kind of account of the Soviet Armed Forces to the Party and the people on the eve of the 100th birth anniversary of V. I. Lenin. The airborne troops were represented by the Guards Order of the Red Banner Chernigov Airborne Division, which raised fifty Heroes of the Soviet Union during the last war.

Leaving for the exercise area, the paratroopers pledged to act skilfully, resolutely and daringly, as their fathers and elder brothers fought in the war. And they lived up to their pledges. It took several thousand paratroopers only twenty-two minutes to land on the snow-covered Byelorussian fields. Another six minutes sufficed to unload the equipment. As a result, twenty-eight minutes were required for the paratroopers to enter battle, an event hitherto unknown in the history of airborne troops.

During this exercise a giant An-22 plane was used for the first time to land troops and materiel, thereby laying the foundations for regular use of new types of military transport aircraft equipment.

The postwar development of the airborne troops proves convincingly that, like all Soviet servicemen, they stand on vigilant guard over the construction of communism.

Soviet paratroopers spare no pains to strengthen their fraternal friendship with servicemen of the other socialist countries, born way back in the fighting against nazi Germany. Joint manoeuvres of the armies of the Warsaw Treaty member states under the code names "October Assault," "Vltava," "Comradeship-in-Arms," "Shield-76," "Brotherhood-in-Arms-80" and others demonstrated the Soviet paratroopers' excellent combat training level, their readiness to act in complicated situations closely approximating real battle, and to fulfil

the assigned missions in an exemplary manner. The authors emphasize that friendship between servicemen of the Soviet army and the armies of the other countries of the Warsaw Treaty is developing and strengthening with every passing day.

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AIR DEFENSE OF FIELD FORCES BY AN AA BATTALION

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 81 pp 16-18

[Article by Col A. Korytko: "Battalion AA During a Defensive Battle"]

[Text] **A modern combat places more stringent requirements upon the subunits' antiaircraft defence. This is attested by the experience of local wars. Aviation played an active role in punitive raids by the American interventionists in Vietnam and Laos. In the armed conflicts in the Middle East the Israeli aggressors used the bulk of sorties of their Air Force for air support of the ground forces.**

Many capitalist countries have developed attack aircraft whose characteristics are best suited to the specific conditions of fighting ground installations.

All this has increased the role of antiaircraft defence of forces, which is now a component part of any all-arms battle.

PURPOSE OF AIR DEFENCE

A battalion occupying a defence area may be attacked by both tactical aircraft and army aviation helicopters. Attacks are most likely against subunits of first and second echelon (reserve) and against battalion CP-OP.

The air enemy will strive to deliver surprise attacks against these objects from low and extremely low altitudes using protective features of the terrain. Tactical aircraft may deliver level, dive and toss attacks using aerial bombs, nonguided missiles, small arms or cannon, and incendiary devices. Combat helicopters may attack battalion armour on request, from ambush or according to a preset plan using ATGMs.

Taking the above into consideration antiaircraft missions can be defined as follows: continuous aerial reconnaissance; timely warning of subunits [illegible] protection of first and second echelon [reserve] subunits, organic and attached fire weapons and the battalion CP-OP from enemy air strikes; prevention of enemy air reconnaissance.

To accomplish these missions the battalion can be reinforced with AA weapons of senior commanders. Methods of their combat employment depend on the nature of air enemy's actions and on the battalion's combat mission. Thus, in one case the AA subunit may be used in full strength to protect a motorised infantry company operating in the area where the main efforts are concentrated, while in another case it may be distributed to provide immediate protection of the defence area.

LOCATION OF AA WEAPONS

The location of AA weapons within the battle formation is determined by the battalion commander's decision. It must ensure protection against enemy air blows from any direction and also continuous all-round observation, warning, reliable communication and camouflage. Launching positions for AA subunits are normally chosen in the immediate vicinity of the battalion CP-OP or within company strong points in the direction of likely raids by enemy planes and helicopters.

The launching positions of the AA subunit should be located at such a distance from the FEBA as to exclude losses from small-arms fire but at the same time provide the possibility to engage the enemy on the approaches to the forward edge.

In addition to the primary launching position several alternate ones are selected and organised for each complex to ensure manoeuvre during mission fulfilment. Absence of alternate positions may result in considerable losses, the enemy will fire at any AA weapons whose positions are revealed. It is very difficult to attain high survivability of an AA system without periodical manoeuvring.

Besides alternate positions, dummy launching sites are organised in defence. To mislead the enemy as to the actual quantity of AA weapons and their location and, hence, as to the battalion combat formation, **use can be made of roving AA groups.** These normally operate in simulated subunit concentration areas and in areas with insufficient AA weapons. The actions of AA groups are planned beforehand by the senior commander. Usually the layout of launching positions and a schedule of AA groups' stay in them are drawn up. As a rule, these groups displace at a certain distance from the area where the main forces are located and engage all the targets flying by.

One must take into account that the flight routes of enemy aircraft may lie outside the air defence zone. In that case AA ambushes are laid. Positions selected for them are carefully organised with engineer works and camouflaged. As soon as air targets appear the gunners suddenly open fire on them. This method has proved very effective and sometimes it forces the enemy to give up low-altitude flights even over areas where he has not spotted AA weapons.

During a defensive battle the AA subunit may also manoeuvre to engage the air enemy in the likely or revealed directions from which his planes and helicopters can approach important installations unobserved. Every such manoeuvre must be approved by the senior commander.

In defence wide use is made of small arms against low-flying air targets. This mission is assigned to subunits not engaged in ground combat with the enemy. Battle experience has shown that small-arms fire is most effective when delivered by a whole subunit (platoon, company).

For timely detection and identification of low-flying targets, warning of personnel and provision of target designation data for AA weapons, counter-air reconnaissance is organised. At the battalion CP-OP and in motorised infantry subunits air observation posts are put out for this purpose. The posts are provided with observation instruments, reference direction indicators, signalling devices and communication facilities, and are located at places allowing all-round observation. The observers carry out reconnaissance by successively surveying the assigned sectors and zones so as to spot in time any planes or helicopters flying at low and very low altitudes. Air raid warnings are conveyed over communication means, by voice, sound and light signals. AA gunners also perform observation missions.

ORGANISATION AND CONDUCT OF AIR DEFENCE

During a tactical exercise Major Kirillov, a battalion commander, was given an operation instruction. His battalion had to operate within the security zone and assume the defensive in the area: Grigoryevo- Hill 158.2 - Hill 155.0 see Sketch). The battalion was reinforced by an AA artillery battery operating as a roving group in the area: Hill 155.0 - Mt. Ploskaya - Abrikosovka, and a platoon of self-propelled AA guns.

When assessing the situation the Bn CO established that "enemy" aviation could approach undetected at low and very low altitudes in the area of the Topky Spring along the Chaikino - Abrikosovka road and in the direction: Hill 156.0-Lake Krugloye. On that assumption, the "enemy" could deliver air strikes at the first echelon and artillery subunits, the battalion CP-OP and at the reserve subunits when the latter mounted a counterattack. "Enemy" helicopter attacks against first echelon subunits could be expected from the lines: Zelyonaya Grove-Vysokaya Grove and Vysokaya Grove-Tyomnaya Grove, and also from the River Sinyushka line during a counterattack.

Having assessed the situation, condition and capabilities of the battalion's and senior commander's AA weapons, the terrain, meteorological and other conditions, the commander decided to organise his air defence on the following pattern: the AA weapons covered the 4th and 5th Mts Inf Coys, the artillery battery, the Bn CP-OP, and also the 3rd Mts Inf Pl with a Tk Pl during a counterattack.



The main positions of the AA subunits were organised on the southern slopes of Hill 150.1, the northern slopes of Hill 155.3, and the southern slopes of Hill 155.0; alternate positions were on the eastern slopes of Hill 150.1, Hill 160.0 and the eastern slopes of Hill 155.0.

In the area of Hill 156.0, i.e. [illegible] the route of flight of "enemy" aviation an[illegible]mbush was laid, comprising one self-propel[illegible] gun.

The decision being approved by the senior commander, Major Kirillov assigned combat missions to his subordinates. When issuing the oral order he indicated to the AA subunit the missions, positions, observation and fire sectors, the firing order, time and degree of readiness. When assigning missions to the motorised infantry subunits the battalion CO indicated, besides other points, the procedure for engaging air targets with small arms.

In organising cooperation he paid special attention to coordinating actions of AA weapons with the subunits protected, carefully considered the problem of continuity of AA protection when retreating to a new line and against different variants of air "enemy" action.

During the night the AA weapon positions were organised with engineer works and camouflaged.

From 0550 to 0600 hrs the "enemy" reconnaissance planes twice appeared in the area and duty AA weapons "opened fire" at them. Soon the "enemy" assumed the offensive. By that time the AA weapons had already changed their positions. Encountering stubborn resistance the attacker withdrew. Some time later the fire attack was repeated. Besides, the "enemy" planes delivered a strike and the 5th Mts Inf Coy with a Tk Pl was shelled by his helicopters from the line: Vysokaya Grove-Tyomnaya Grove. The AA weapons successfully repulsed the attacks, timely warning contributing much to the success.

Supported by the aviation the "enemy" again launched an attack. As the battalion was defending a wide frontage it had difficulty in withstanding the pressure. On order of the senior commander the subunits began to withdraw to the second position. Nevertheless the assigned mission was fulfilled: the "enemy" deployed before meeting the main forces and reduced his rate of advance. Besides, he disclosed the location of his main forces and the direction of the attack. The reliable air defence contributed in no small measure to this.

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RADAR SITE TACTICAL TRAINING EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 81 pp 19-20

[Article by Engr-Col A. Bolyakov: "Sentinels of the Sky"]

[Text]

It was April and the valleys turned green and the forest thicket broke into young leaf. But at the top of the hill it was still cold. Sometimes a slightly visible haze covering the hill summit turned to thick clouds swollen with moisture and a heavy snowfall came down suddenly. In a snowswirl accompanied by a strong wind radar aerials began to hum, their reflectors rotating tirelessly.

In the cabin the fans buzzed monotonously and a garland of many-coloured lamps gleamed in the dark. A yellow scanning spot ran over the screen leaving behind golden luminous marks that slowly faded away. Radar operators bent over the screens. All of a sudden a blip from an "enemy" aircraft appeared on the indicator screen with a red broken line designating the lock-on boundary.

Thus one April evening began an exercise of which the subordinates of Major Solomatin had not been informed in advance.

A report came without delay: "Target detected! Bearing... Range..."

Soon one more target blip appeared on the screen, then another... Now the plotting board was covered with curves representing target routes.

Major Solomatin carefully watched his subordinates' actions correlating the information received with the target blips on the remote PPI screen. His main task was to determine the "enemy's" tactical intention and to take measures not to let a single target pass undetected.

Yefreitor Shulyak, a first-class specialist, had to deal with a great number of target blips. But despite this he managed to compute target coordinates without a hitch. The air situation was extremely complicated: the targets performed vertical and heading manoeuvres and, boosting their engines, tried to approach the defence installation at high speed.

Suddenly bright ripples ran across the screen and part of it was lit up brightly. This meant that the "enemy" was jamming.

The order was given immediately to swich on countermeasure devices.

Keeping his eyes glued to the screen Yefreitor Shulyak manipulated the relevant controls. The indicator screen darkened somewhat, target blips showing clearly on it. Then some "enemy" aircraft made an abrupt manoeuvre and the target blips began to disappear. This was immediately reported to Major Solomatin. He quickly assessed the situation and came to the conclusion that some "enemy" planes were approching the defence installation at low altitude under cover of the accidents of the terrain.

"Switch on auxiliary detection equipment!" came the order from the CP. Soon new target data arrived at battalion CP.

Success of a mission depends largely on the proficiency of CP specialists and above all on their tactical skill. Radar operators constantly improve their knowledge of the likely enemy, studying the tactical and technical data of his aircraft and air attack weapons and his tactical methods for neutralising antiaircraft defences. They also spare no effort to get a clear picture of the capabilities of the radar equipment, the visibility

zones and the terrain features. The subunit specialists have made a terrain model which is of great help in training. It shows both the terrain features in the area of radar reconnaissance and radar visibility zones. During training the instructor "rehearses" "enemy" raids. He familiarises the trainees with the variants of the "enemy's" approach to defence installations, his tactics, jamming technique and methods of neutralising radar by fire. In every situation, the trainee must take a decision which will enable him to detect the target at maximum range and to supply reliable information uninterruptedly.

The subunit specialists have worked out several variants of enemy air attacks, taking into account his tactics. All these variants have been studied thoroughly by the radar operators. As a result they need only seconds to ascertain the situation and to carry out the order, when it comes.

The radar operators develop their combat skill in conditions of a suddenly changing situation or when it is complicated by unexpected narratives or weapons of high destructive power. They also learn to defend their positions against enemy land forces.

During the exercise the following narrative was given: "Some of the crew members are disabled. An 'enemy' airborne force is landed near the radar site." On the battalion commander's order a special team was organised to strengthen the defence of the radar site. Some action stations were manned by stand-by operators. They are men who usually operate the auxiliary equipment but have also acquired radar operators' skill. Mastering related specialities is now one of the most important components of combat training. Subunits have to operate at a considerable distance from each other and from the unit HQ, so they must be able to carry out their air defence missions independently in the most complicated situations.

For instance, one of the men with the best professional skills is Private Polyntsev, who can detect a target and supply information to the CP in an extremely short time. During the exercise the "enemy" considerably increased the number of blips on the screen in an effort to mislead the operator by passive jamming. But Polyntsev did not lose his presence of mind. Orientating himself by hardly noticeable signs, he unmistakably distinguished between true and false target blips and continued to furnish data with great precision. After his report to the CP that the "enemy" had introduced jamming, the commander decided to switch on counter-measure devices. Polyntsev carried out his commander's order by skilfully adjusting the indicator to operate in different conditions.

The "enemy" made more attempts to break through to the defence installation. Moving from different directions at high and minimum altitudes, the targets flew complicated manoeuvres and used various kinds of jamming. However, the radar operators detected the "enemy" aircraft at maximum range and supplied accurate and reliable information both to the CP and to the crews of the appropriate antiaircraft weapons.

When the tactical exercise was over, Major Solomatin analysed the actions of every crew member. He cited as models those who had worked correctly and shown high psychological stability. He also analysed the mistakes of his subordinates and gave instructions how to avoid them. This exercise helped to improve the radar operators' skill and was a test of their vigilance and teamwork.

Radar operators keep watch both day and night in any weather. Nicknamed the "eyes and ears" or "sentinels of the sky" they have the honourable but far-from-easy task of detecting the air enemy and determining his coordinates. Extreme vigilance and readiness for action are laws for them. Radar operators guard their country's sky from the Arctic Ocean to the mountain ranges in the south and from the Far East to the Baltic Sea. No matter where or when the enemy appears, they will detect him without delay and provide the necessary data for the powerful missiles of the AA rocket forces and all-weather interceptors of the fighter aviation to be ready for action within seconds.

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DAMAGE CONTROL EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 81 pp 23-24

[Article by Engr-Capt 1st Rank M. Taiporukha: "Ship's Combat Exercise"]

[Text]

COMBAT exercises on a ship are carried out regularly. They are divided into preparatory, test, training, control and demonstration exercises.

Preparatory exercises may be intended to work up smooth cooperation between ship's services and departments both in battle and when dealing with some elements of tactical missions. Test exercises are conducted after each task on the training curriculum has been completed. Their purpose is to check the level of the men's knowledge and skill and the degree of their combat readiness. Training exercises are carried out to maintain the specified combat training standards. They may follow test exercises, their frequency being determined by the ship's CO. Control exercises are conducted by senior commanders to check the combat readiness of the crew and the ship as a whole. Such exercises may be carried out either without or after previous notification.

And, finally, demonstration exercises are designed to show how various exercises for the different groups of personnel are carried out.

Combat exercises require thorough preparation of the ship's crew. They are not held before every crew member has acquired firm skills in performing his duties at action stations and CPs in the course of the relevant training.

Here is how a damage control exercise was prepared and carried out on a patrol ship of the Order of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet. The ship's CO, Captain 3rd Rank Rakhimov, bearing in mind the importance of thorough preparation for each exercise to be a success, drew up a plan of the forthcoming training. Being in charge of preparatory and training exercises he took account of his subordinates' training standard and strong and weak points when drawing up the plan.

Rakhimov formulated the theme of the exercise precisely and defined the main purpose of the exercise so that the personnel knew what was required of them. The exercise plan included only 2-3 training questions to be worked up.

He also carefully thought out and formulated some particular training purposes and set additional tasks for the ship's services and departments.

When working out a mission the ship's CO gave much thought to the tactical situation, the narratives, the priorities in solving the tasks and the crew's actions during the various episodes. Then he specified the date and duration of the exercise. A damage control exercise on a ship usually lasts two hours.

According to the exercise plan the ship's crew was to operate in a complicated emergency situation. To attain this, Rakhimov planned to introduce such narratives as water and fire fighting and eliminating damage and failures of some weapons and equipment. His plan also envisaged that officers should carry out both their own duties and those of a higher rank.

Although no weapons are actually used during a ship's combat exercise, the crew must be able to make all the necessary tactical calculations concerning weapons and ship manoeuvrability. Accordingly Rakhimov planned maximum use of

the ship's equipment. Should the exercise have been held at sea, he would have included elements of manoeuvring in his plan.

In order to make the situation more instructive and closer to real battle, Rakhimov's plan also envisaged the crew repulsing an enemy air attack and eliminating the consequences of its powerful blows. He did everything possible to simulate the effect of enemy firing on the ship.

Every exercise is carried out according to a schedule specifying the time of events and the actions of the ship's departments and services.

Rakhimov paid special attention to narratives. Being free from prompting of any kind they required the trainees to act independently as, for instance, to find faults causing the failure of equipment or instruments, to decide on the priority of their actions to fulfil the task and so on.

Substantial importance was attached to the way of bringing narratives to the subordinates' notice. As a rule, they are conveyed either orally or by messengers who deliver secret messages or cards containing excerpts from the schedule. The first to be conveyed are the narratives proceeding from a suddenly changing situation. The content of secret messages is made known at the time when they are to be put into effect. That time is marked on the envelopes. The next narratives to be notified are those already known to the personnel.

Rakhimov appended to the exercise plan a list of additional narratives proposed by department heads and service chiefs. Corresponding by their content to the main events of the exercise these narratives made the situation tenser when particular tasks were being coped with.

The quality of the exercise depended largely on the training level of umpires appointed by an order of the CO. Special attention was devoted to umpires' briefing. They were well familiarised with the content of the exercise and with the situation obtaining. To be able to assess the personnel's actions properly, the umpires checked their own knowledge of use of simulators and precautionary measures. At an exercise the umpire must always be on the alert to prevent serious mistakes, damage to weapons and equipment or injuries to crews. All this imposes great responsibility on him. He himself may introduce narratives provided they do not interfere with the specified exercise procedure. After the exercise, the umpires report the results to the exercise director together with their suggestions for improving the organisation of training and exercises.

A critique was held on the next day. The ship's CO reminded to the officers of the theme and the aim of the exercise. Then he announced how the critique was to be conducted. The executive officer briefly recalled the main episodes, common mistakes and incorrect actions of the personnel at action stations. Then he analysed in detail the umpires' reports and the operation of the intercommunication system. After that he brought to light instances when information coming up from action stations had not been summarised and CPs had failed to select the most valuable data. This led to wordy reports to the main control room on minor events and complicated work. To illustrate this the executive officer recalled an instance of how a small fire which was soon extinguished was reported in great detail as if it were critical damage which could affect the fulfilment of the mission assigned.

Further reports were made by the deputy commander for political affairs and the engineering department commander. In conclusion the ship's CO assessed the success of the exercise and the preparedness of the ships' departments and services.

The heads of departments and service chiefs then held critiques in their subunits. They dwelt on the personnel's actions and analysed the mistakes made, explaining to the men how they should have behaved in a particular situation. At the end of the critique the preparedness of action stations and departments was assessed and sailors who had coped successfully with their tasks were commended.

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HISTORICAL INFORMATION ON SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 81 pp 25-27

[Article by Engr-Col V. Matosov: "Seaplanes"]

[Text]

Complying with our readers' requests, we publish an article on the history of the Soviet naval air arm.

Seaplanes are vehicles capable of taking off from and landing on water. They are divided into three types: flying boats, float planes and amphibious planes. Craft of the first type are so called because their hull resembles a boat. They float owing to high buoyancy of the watertight hull. Their transverse stability is enhanced by floats located under the wings. Seaplanes of the second type are provided with cigar-shaped floats instead of landing gear. Amphibious planes are actually flying boats, capable of both taking off and landing on water and land aerodromes.

The naval air arm was created simultaneously with the air force as a whole and the entire Armed Forces of the young Soviet Republic.

In designing the first seaplanes the Soviet aircraft manufacturing industry took into account prerevolutionary experience.

The first Russian seaplane was designed in 1911 by Ya. Gakkel. It was awarded the great silver medal at the International Exhibition. In 1914 Russian designers produced a float version of the famous "Ilya Muromets," the best heavy bomber of the First World War.

The world's first flying boat was built in 1911 by Russian engineer O. Kostovich.

Appreciable results were achieved by young designer D. Grigorovich, whose bureau developed (in 1913-15) flying boats, including the M-9, which was distinguished for its rational design and high combat characteristics. It had a compartment in the nose from which the observer could fire. Originally this compartment housed a machine gun, but in 1916 it was equipped with a 37-mm semiautomatic cannon. The boat could also carry a bomb load. The following facts attest to the high nautical and flying qualities of the M-9. US and Britain war departments purchased several units of the machine to study its design. In 1916, Russian pilot I. Nagursky, flying this seaplane performed a normal loop. The M-9 was in service with the Red Army till the end of the Civil War (1918-20).

In the early 20s, on the instructions of the Soviet Government, D. Grigorovich set up an experimental naval aviation department in Leningrad, which developed in 1922 the Soviet first seaplane—the flying boat M-24. This was widely used in naval aviation for ice patrolling and cartographic work.

In the early days of aviation wood, plywood and strong fabrics were the basic structural materials. As airplane speeds and engine power increased, these materials no longer met aircraft manufacturing standards. This was the case particularly in seaplane manufacture. After a certain number of impacts on the water during touchdown the plywood bottom of a flying boat deteriorated and its individual wooden parts became unserviceable due to inadequate water resistance.

Plywood and wood therefore were replaced by bakelite plywood impregnated with moisture-resistant substances at high temperature and pressure. Until the mid-40s bakelite plywood was widely used in naval aviation for building light planes. Some time later the Soviet industry started to produce light aviation metals, thereby making it possible to build an all-metal seaplane.

In 1927-36 a special seaplane design bureau developed sea reconnaissance planes—ROM-1 and ROM-2 flying boats. During the same period A. N. Tupolev's design bureau produced the MRD-2, long-range reconnaissance plane, the MK-1 sea cruiser and the MTB-2 heavy naval bomber. Designer I. Chetverikov developed the Che-2 multipurpose flying boat.

In the 1930s V. Shavrov designed an amphibious flying boat with an air-cooled engine and a retractable wheel landing gear. It operated on local and long-distance mail and passenger lines, was used for ice patrolling and in fish and sea-hunting reconnaissance, particularly in the difficult take-off and landing conditions of the North.

After D. Grigorovich his bureau was headed by his talented pupil G. Beriyev, who devoted nearly forty years of his life to seaplanes. His first major success was the creation of the MBR-2 single-engine short-range maritime reconnaissance plane (flying boat).

This plane had a high lifting capacity, good nautical characteristics and a considerable (up to 1,500 km) flying range. The detachable ski and wheel landing gear allowed the MBR-2 to be based on land aerodromes.

In 1937, owing to the high flying characteristics of the MBR-2, Soviet woman pilot P. Osipenko beat the world records in lifting capacity, speed and flying range. During the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) the MBR-2 naval reconnaissance plane was also used as a bomber and an assault plane. Pilots flying the MBR-2 were not afraid to engage enemy fighters.

Once, flying over the sea, a reconnaissance plane piloted by Senior Lieutenant Geresin was suddenly attacked by a nazi Me-110 fighter. The unprecedented dogfight which followed lasted nearly two hours. Though the fighter was superior to the MBR-2 in speed, manoeuvrability and fire power, it could not get the better of it. The reconnaissance plane's crew displayed perfect teamwork and, when the German pilot made a mistake, an accurate machine-gun burst raked the "Messerschmitt."

During the prewar period Beriyev's bureau also worked on ship-based planes. Thus, the serially-produced Be-2 and then the Be-4 were used as naval reconnaissance planes. These all-metal machines with folding wings were launched from the ship's catapult and developed a speed up to 356 km/h. They could carry a 300-kg bomb load and thus be used as bombers.

Beriyev's bureau carried out extensive research work to develop dismountable and folding naval reconnaissance planes to fit into small-size hangar compartments of submarines.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War Beriyev's bureau went on improving battle-tested machines and designed new ones. One of the latter was the Be-6 twin-engine flying boat intended for submarine fighting. It was in service with the navy for nearly twenty years. Approximately at the same time the bureau designed the Be-8 amphibious plane.

After the Second World War rocket aviation, including naval, developed at a great pace. As a result of persistent research effort G. Beriyev's collective produced the experimental R-1 seaplane, which passed the tests successfully.

The twin turbojet engine M-10 flying boat built on the basis of the R-1 enabled Soviet pilot to set, in 1961, twelve world seaplane records in speed (912 km/h), altitude (14,962 m without and 11,997 m with a 15-t load), and lifting capacity (15,206 kg).

The creation of a new plane with two gas-turbine engines was another step forward in seaplane manufacture. Flying this machine in the late 60s, Soviet pilots established twenty world speed, altitude, range and lifting capacity records.

Modern seaplanes are provided with intricate equipment. To fight a submarine — a most up-to-date powerful ship, a seaplane must therefore be highly manoeuvrable, capable of flying at low and high altitudes, in adverse weather conditions.

These planes carry a perfect navigation equipment, which helps the navigator to find the plane's coordinates by means of a computer at any given moment.

To detect a submarine, use is made of an automatic search magnetometer, in which the recorder unit tape records signals sent by the instrument and returned from the sea depths.

To get the plane's bearings, the crew drops an orientation bomb. On detecting the submarine, a marker buoy is put out to signal its approach. Switching the instrument to the "compass" mode, the crew transfers the task of submarine tracking to the automatic devices.

After marking the submarine's location, the crew radioes its coordinates and, if the order to destroy it is received, the plane attacks it with depth charges.

The naval air arm, an integral part of the Soviet Navy, is being constantly improved to enable the navymen to cope successfully with the mission of further strengthening the Soviet Union's defence capability.

TANKERS OF THE FUTURE

The Baltudoproekt central designing bureau has developed a project of an oil tanker incorporating a number of the latest technical achievements. According to the regulations of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization each tanker must have 41 per cent of its tanks protected, but in the new one all 100 per cent of tanks will be protected against direct contact with water.

The tanker will be 242.8 m long, 32.2 m wide; it will have a displacement of 84,600 tons and a cargo capacity of 68,000 tons; maximum power of the main engine will be 18,500 hp and the speed will be 16 knots. These vessels will replace the existing tankers of the "Sofia" series. They will have 25-30 years of service life. They will be the tankers of the 21st century.

"OTTO SHMIDT" ICEBREAKER

The world's first research icebreaker has been put into service. This unique ship was built by the Leningrad Admiralty Association. The displacement of the icebreaker is 3,650 tons, it is equipped with a 5,400 hp diesel-electric engine and can sail 11 thousand miles without refuelling.

On board the icebreaker are 14 research laboratories provided with up-to-date equipment for hydrographical, oceanographical, meteorological and other investigations in insufficiently explored and difficultly accessible areas of the Arctic Ocean. Research data will be processed by the ship computer centre.

INTO THE HEART OF THE EARTH

The Kola superdeep hole located in the north-west of the peninsula of the same name has passed the 10,000 m mark. Such a depth has been reached for the first time in history.

The investigators received unique material which will help solve fundamental problems of geology. For instance, the scientists expected that temperature at a depth of about 10,000 m should not exceed 90°, but actually it was found to be over 160°. It has been ascertained that at such depths there are gas, mineralising solutions, various minerals. New data has been also obtained on the Earth's structure.

During the boring a production technique has been mastered which will ensure effective rapid drilling to depths where the pressure reaches 1,000 and more atmospheres. Intensive drilling continues around the clock to reach the planned 15 km mark.

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COMMENTS ON SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVES SINCE 1975

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 81 pp 45-47

[Unattributed article: "'Soviet Threat'--to Whom?"]

[Text]

Bourgeois propaganda spares no effort to scare peace-loving people with the myth of a "Soviet threat," declaring that "Moscow is undermining détente." The purpose of this campaign launched in the USA and other NATO countries is to sow fear and thus force people to accept a further increase in military expenditures. And it must be admitted that this deceitful but skilful propaganda has a certain influence on public opinion, promoting political, material and psychological preparation of war.

At this point one cannot help asking questions. Can peace be threathened by a state which unilaterally withdraws its armed forces from the forward lines of defence? By a state which has no military bases on foreign territories? Can peace be threathened by a state which submits one proposal after another for stopping the arms race, prohibiting the creation of new weapons of war, and takes other peace initiatives — from partial measures banning atomic and then thermonuclear weapons to the complete and general disarmament?

The foreign-policy initiatives taken by the Soviet Union since the All-European Conference in Helsinki are the best illustration of its immutable and firm peaceful policy.

Here are some of them.

1975

At the 30th session of the United Nations General Assembly (September 16-December 17) the Soviet Union tabled the following two proposals: **"On the Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and of New Systems of Such Weapons"** and **"On the Treaty of the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests."**

The first proposal was based on the fact that the danger of scientific and technological achievements being used to create basically new types of weapons of mass destruction was becoming increasingly real.

The second proposal provided that each state signing the treaty would undertake to prohibit, prevent and refrain from carrying out any test explosions in any place under its jurisdiction or control in all environments — in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and underground.

The prohibitions would not apply to underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Such explosions could be carried out in the case of non-nuclear weapon states in accordance with the provisions of Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in the case of nuclear weapon states in accordance with a special agreement to be drawn up as soon as possible.

1976

At the 31st session of the UN General Assembly (September 21-December 22) the Soviet Union proposed the inclusion in the agenda of an item entitled **"Conclusion of a World Treaty of the Non-Use of Force in International Relations"** and presented a draft of such a treaty. Its primary purpose was to make the principle of the non-use of force embodied in the UN Charter an integral part of the policies of all states, an effective rule of international life. In accordance with the draft treaty, the use of both nuclear and conventional weapons should be completely excluded

from inter-state relations. At the same time the draft treaty, proceeding from the generally accepted standards of international law, did not affect the inviolable right of peoples to fight for their social and national liberation.

The USSR submitted to the same session a **Memorandum on Questions of Ending the Arms Race and of Disarmament.** The Memorandum contained a deep analysis of the state of the struggle of the peoples to curb the arms race and for disarmament, outlined the most important tasks in that field, expounded in detail the views on the ways and possibilities of their solution.

The Memorandum named the following main lines for coordinated actions: cessation of the nuclear arms race, reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons; prohibition of their tests; consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons; prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction; reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments; establishment of zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions; reduction of military budgets.

Together with other countries of the socialist community —the Warsaw Treaty member states—the USSR proposed in November 1976 to all states signatories to the Final Act of the All-European Conference in Helsinki, to conclude a treaty not to be the first to use nuclear weapons one against the other, and to suspend the operation of those articles of the Warsaw and North Atlantic Treaties which allow expansion of these alliances.

1977

At the 32nd UN General Assembly session the USSR submitted for discussion an important and urgent question **"Deepening and Consolidation of International Détente and Prevention of the Danger of Nuclear War"** and presented a "Draft Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Detente" and a "Draft Resolution on the Prevention of the Danger of Nuclear War."

The first document contained a call to all states to ensure the speedy peaceful settlement of conflict situations and lessen military confrontation, to complete the process of eliminating the remains of the colonial system, racism and apartheid, to restructure international economic relations on an equitable and democratic basis.

The second document underlined the urgent necessity for developing such relations among all the states, and above all among nuclear states, as to reduce and ultimately eliminate the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war.

At the same session the Soviet Union put forward another proposal: to declare, concurrent with the prohibition of all nuclear tests for a specific period of time, a moratorium on nuclear explosions conducted for peaceful purposes and to reach an agreement with the USA and Great Britain not to conduct underground nuclear tests within a definite period.

1978

From the tribune of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament (May 23-June 30) the delegation of the USSR submitted a complex of proposals entitled **"On Practical Measures for Ending the Arms Race."** They envisaged:

First. Direction of main efforts of all states on measures to halt the nuclear arms race and then completely renounce the production of nuclear weapons and proceed to a gradual reduction in their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

Second. Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons; solution of the problem of the non-use of these weapons against non-nuclear states; expansion of international cooperation in research activities concerning new sources and types of energy which do not involve increased nuclear risk.

Third. Solution of the problem of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of states where there are no such weapons at present.

Fourth. Prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction; taking of international action to rule out, once and for all, the appearance and deployment of neutron weapons.

Fifth. Early completion of the talks at bilateral, regional and international levels on ending the arms race.

Sixth. Strengthening of those international treaties and agreements in force designed to limit the arms race; a call to all UN member states, who have so far failed to accede to them, to do so.

Seventh. Reduction, by agreement, of military budgets by states with a large economic and military potential, including all permanent members of the Security Council, not in terms of percentage (against which a number of states raised objections arguing that military budgets are not comparable) but in absolute figures.

In November 1978 the Soviet Union, together with its Warsaw Treaty partners, proposed a series of measures in the field of military détente, including:

— conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations that would provide for the commitment by all states to renounce the use of force or the threat of force in all its forms and manifestations, including a ban on the use of nuclear weapons;

— strict observance by all states participants in the All-European Conference of the commitment not to use force or the threat of force in relations with one another;

— implementation of the proposal that all participants of the Helsinki Conference commit themselves not to be the

first to use nuclear weapons one against the other; that the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries should not increase the number of participants in their alliances, that the scale of military exercises by the sides in Europe should be limited to the level of 50-60 thousand troops, and that the measures of confidence on which agreement was reached at the All-European Conference should be applied to the Mediterranean area.

At the 33rd session of the UN General Assembly (September 19-December 21, 1978, January 15-29, 1979) the Soviet delegation proposed to discuss the question **"Conclusion of an International Convention on the Strengthening of Guarantees of the Security of Non-Nuclear States"** and submitted a draft of such a convention. The draft provided for an undertaking of the states parties to such a convention not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states parties to this convention which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and which have no nuclear weapons on their territory.

At that session the Soviet Union submitted a second proposal **"On the Non-Deployment of Nuclear Weapons on the Territory of States Where There Are No Such Weapons at Present."** The USSR sees the solution of this problem in concluding an international agreement the basis of which should be the commitment by the nuclear powers not to station nuclear weapons on the territories where there are no such weapons at present. Alongside this, would be recorded the intention of non-nuclear states to refrain from any steps which might lead to the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories.

1979

An action of exceptional importance was undertaken by the USSR and its Warsaw Treaty allies in **October 1979.** We mean the whole complex of proposals aimed at deepening détente advanced by L. I. Brezhnev in his speech in Berlin on October 6. First, in contrast to US and NATO plans to deploy new types of American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the USSR expressed its readiness to reduce, as compared with the present level, the number of medium-range nuclear weapons now deployed in the western regions of the USSR provided NATO refrains from building up "eurostrategic weapons." Secondly, in order to break the stalemate over the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, the Soviet Union decided to withdraw unilaterally within a year from the GDR 20 thousand troops, a thousand tanks and a certain amount of other military equipment. The USSR has already implemented this decision. Thirdly, the Soviet Union submitted proposals aimed at further broadening the confidence-building measures in Europe. The USSR is prepared to reach an agreement on advance notification of large-scale exercises of land forces, as provided for by the Helsinki Final Act, starting not from the level of 25 thousand as is the case now, but from the level of 20 thousand men, and proposed that such notification be given earlier. The USSR is also prepared, on a reciprocal basis, not to hold military exercises involving more than 40-50 thousand troops.

At the 34th session of the UN General Assembly (September 18, 1979-January 7, 1980) the Soviet Union proposed the inclusion in the agenda of an item entitled **"On the Inadmissibility of the Policy of Hegemonism in International Relations"** and submitted a draft of a corresponding decision. The idea of the decision is that states or groups of states shall in no circumstances and for no motive whatever claim hegemony in international affairs, nor shall they strive for a dominating position either in the world as a whole, or in one or another region thereof.

1980

Among the major foreign-policy actions of 1980 mention must be made of a proposal put forward in May by the Soviet Union together with the other Warsaw Treaty countries, that a meeting of heads of states of all regions of the world be held in the immediate future to discuss possible ways of eliminating centres of international tension and of preventing war.

In **July 1980** the socialist states taking part in the Vienna talks tabled new important proposals. First, that the USA and the USSR reduce their armed forces in Central Europe by 13,000 and 20,000 effectives respectively (not counting the contingent that has been already unilaterally withdrawn by the Soviet Union from the GDR). Secondly, the socialist states agreed to create (after completion of both stages of reduction) a mechanism for maintaining equal collective levels of numerical strength of the forces of the two military-political groupings—NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. In no one country should the numerical strength of the armed forces in Central Europe be more than 50 per cent of the general collective levels of 900,000 men for each of these military-political alliances.

Mention must be also made of another peace initiative of the USSR submitted by L. I. Brezhnev during the Soviet-West German meeting held in **July 1980** in Moscow — to discuss the question of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe simultaneously and in organic connection with the question of American forward-based nuclear weapons.

At the 35th session of the UN General Assembly the Soviet Union suggested to include in the agenda as an important and urgent question an item **"On Some Urgent Measures for the Lessening of War Danger"** and presented a draft resolution which calls upon states to abstain from expanding the existing military-political groupings

and creating new ones. It is suggested that all states, above all permanent members of the Security Council and countries connected with them by military agreements, should abstain as from January 1, 1981 from increasing their armed forces. The resolution calls for strengthening guarantees of security of non-nuclear states by concluding an appropriate international convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states not having them on their territory.

Among other proposals submitted by the Soviet delegation to the session was the memorandum **"For Peace and Disarmament, for International Security Guarantees,"** and the resolution on the historical responsibility of states for the preservation of nature on the earth for present and future generations. The purpose of the memorandum is to limit the arms race. The purpose of the resolution is to prevent the disastrous consequences of the military activities of states for the environment.

All these facts irrefutably testify that the Soviet Union spares no effort to stop the arms race, eliminate the military threat and strengthen the cause of peace. They testify that the "Soviet threat" is a threat to the imperialistic war policy, to the policy of unrestricted arms race, to the deepening of international tension. The Soviet "offensive" is a peace! ! offensive which meets the interests of the whole of mankind.

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SOVIET VIEWS ON ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

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[Article by V. Yefremov: "The Indian Ocean, Confrontation Arena or Peace Zone?"]

[Text]

Late in January 1981 the Bureau of the Presidium, World Peace Council, held a session in Antananarivo, capital of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar. The session adopted important documents which will serve to guide the Council in its work. In the present world situation the declaration "To Turn the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf into a Peace Zone" which was approved by the participants in the session is of special importance. It is an appeal of the peace movement headquarters to all peace-loving peoples to undertake broad action to stem the mounting preparations of US imperialism for war in this vast area. The session highly assessed the constructive proposals Leonid I. Brezhnev, Head of the Soviet state, advanced at a meeting with Indian parliamentarians in December 1980. Their purpose is to strengthen peace in the Indian Ocean.

The transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and cooperation is time-honoured dream of the peoples of that region who account for one third of the world population. Unfortunately the countries in this area are an object of expansionist aspirations on the part of the imperialist powers. The Indian Ocean has been and continues to be a zone of conflict and large concentrations of troops and armaments which not unfrequently go into action.

The Indian Ocean, and particularly the Persian Gulf, has become a key direction in the hegemonistic policy of US imperialism. The US Administration has declared it a "sphure of US national interest." On this pretext the Pentagon has sent naval task forces to the Indian Ocean on twenty occasions since 1972. Each task force spent up to two months in the area. Recently the USA has maintained there a fleet of several dozen warships, including aircraft carriers, on a permanent basis. The Pentagon has admitted that the armada concentrated in the north-west of the ocean alone is superior to the combined armed forces of all the countries in the region. In the beginning of 1979 the Defence Department announced the formation of a separate strategic unit, namely a special Fifth Fleet comprising 40-50 units, to be permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean in order to "defend the national interests of the USA."

The main US naval base in the Indian Ocean is the island of Diego Garcia which was annexed by Great Britain from the state of Mauritius and leased to the USA in 1966. The Pentagon built a large complex of structures and other facilities on the island for its navy and air force, including docks capable of receiving aircraft carriers and missile carrying submarines, a runway to take B-52 strategic bombers, an air defence system, large fuel storage tanks, depots, etc. Intending to expand this combined base considerably, the Pentagon has allocated a sum of 175 million dollars to be spent in 1981.

It is this Diego Garcia complex that is to be the main base for the so-called "rapid deployment force." The US press reports that at present it has a strength of close to 200,000 officers and men, to be increased to 300,000. In pursuit of Directive No. 18 of August 1977 this "mobile force" is to "respond quickly to local wars without diverting US forces from their regular stations in Europe and Asia." In other words, it will be used for intervening in the internal affairs of Asian and African countries.

Parallel to this, Washington is making persistent efforts to set up military bases along the entire perimeter of the Indian Ocean. The USA has secured the consent of a number of governments to use bases in the island of Masirah, in Es-Seeb, Tamrait and Raysut (Oman), Berbera (Somali), and Mombasa (Kenya). The Colombo journal "Nation" says that Washington wants Sri Lanka to make available to the Pentagon the naval base at Trinkomali and the air field in Katunayaka. In Australia the Pentagon intends to secure a naval base at Cockburn Sound. The USA got the government of Thailand to return many military installations in that country. In all the Pentagon now has more than 30 bases in the Indian Ocean.

The USA is vigorously enlisting its allies by various aggressive blocs in its preparations for war in the Indian

Ocean and provocations against Iran and other countries. London has readily responded to Washington's call. It is hatching plans for returning to its imperial "East of Suez" policy. "Aviation Week and Space Technology" of July 7, 1980 wrote that Britain was considering a plan for a "rapid deployment force" of its own, which though smaller in size, will be organised on the same lines as that of the USA for cooperation with the latter. Several other countries have responded too. As a result, 40 US warships and approximately 20 warships belonging to its European and Asian allies — Britain, France and Australia are patrolling the Indian Ocean.

US efforts to activise ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the USA), ANZUK (Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia and Singapore) and to create new blocs have given rise to legitimate anxiety among the peoples of Asia and Africa. The "Observer" wrote that the USA was working vigorously to create a "security pact" in the Persian Gulf area. It intends to draw in Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. In the Far East Washington is seeking to unite its bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea and its military ties with Thailand into a single bloc to be known as NEATO—North-East Asia Treaty Organisation.

The Peking hegemonists are playing the role of accomplices of imperialist circles in building up tensions in the Indian Ocean. For instance, Peking has repeatedly made statements in support of US military presence in Asia. In particular, the Peking leaders outspokenly approved of the US base in Diego Garcia. It is not fortuitous that many political observers refer to "parallelism in US and PRC actions" and even to a sort of "division of functions" in containment of national-liberation movements in Asia and Africa. The Asian public is apprehensive of China's Southern Fleet which has been increased to 300 ships and is being further expanded. One cannot help asking: Does this not mean that China may take over foreign islands and possibly other territories, as it seized the Paracel Islands in 1974?

Though Washington is continuing to force its expansion in Asia, it is trying to pass off this line as a "retaliatory" measure for the entry of a limited Soviet contingent into Afghanistan at the request of its legitimate government to safeguard the country's sovereignty against imperialist infringements and attacks. At the same time Western propaganda is accusing the USSR of attempts to "force its way to the warm seas" and to "block oil deliveries to the West."

These arguments and pretexts hold no water. US military penetration into the Indian Ocean started long before the Afghan revolution triumphed, long before Washington joined hands with Peking to set their stooge Pakistan against revolutionary Afghanistan and to wage an undeclared war against it. It was not the presence of a limited Soviet contingent in Afghanistan that caused the USA to start and to continue its penetration into the Indian Ocean. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said:

"What Washington needed was merely a pretext to extend its expansion in Asia, and it is creating such pretexts by all sorts of ways... The main thing is that the USA wishes to create a network of military bases in the Indian Ocean, in the Middle East, in Africa. The USA would like to submit these countries to its hegemony, to pump out their natural wealth without interference. And at the same time to use their territories in pursuit of its strategic plans against the world of socialism and people's liberation forces. That is what it all boils down to."

It may also be mentioned in passing that the countries of the Indian Ocean area have vast reserves of oil, uranium, gold, tin and diamonds. The region is known as a world producer of rubber, tea, spices and jute. The waters of the Indian Ocean are hoards of wealth too. Finally, the sea routes through it are open all year round. In addition they connect practically all the continents of the planet. All this is a tremendous temptation to US imperialists.

In December 1971 the 26th UN General Assembly session proclaimed the Indian Ocean a peace zone. That was nearly ten years ago. It voiced an appeal to the USA to discontinue the escalation of its military presence in the Indian Ocean and to all other countries concerned to dismantle all their military bases and installations in the area. However, the struggle of the peoples of this area to achieve this noble goal has encountered stiff resistance on the part of aggressive circles in the USA, other imperialist states and Maoist China.

As to the Soviet Union, it warmly supported all attempts to demilitarise the Indian Ocean. It regards the military bases there as the main source of danger in the region. That is why it has been persistently working to eliminate them. Way back in 1976 Leonid I. Brezhnev said:

"...The Soviet Union has never had, and has no intention now, of building military bases in the Indian Ocean. And we call on the United States to take the same stand." Here we may recall that from June 1977 to February 1978 a Soviet-American dialogue on the matter was held on the Soviet Union's initiative. However, it was broken off unilaterally by the American side. Since then the USA has flatly refused to renew it.

World opinion refers to the proposals L. I. Brezhnev made in New Delhi in a speech to Indian parliamentarians on December 10, 1980 as a programme of peace and security for the Indian Ocean. Setting forth his urgent and concrete proposals on the Persian Gulf the Head of the Soviet state said:

"The Soviet Union is a staunch champion of the idea that the Indian Ocean be turned into a peace zone. We are ready to actively work together with other interested states in this direction. We believe that the Indian Ocean has been and remains the sphere of vital interests of the states located on its shores, but not of any other states."

During the state visit of friendship of L. I. Brezhnev to India the USSR and India signed a joint declaration in which

they reaffirmed their readiness to cooperate in order to implement the UN Declaration on the proclamation of the Indian Ocean a peace zone and their support for the decision of the UN General Assembly on the convocation of a conference on the matter. They call for the liquidation of all foreign military and naval bases in the region, such as the base in Diego Garcia, and prevention of the creation of new bases. They condemn all attempts to build up a foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean on whatever pretext.

The struggle for turning the Indian Ocean into a peace zone is mounting. The whole of mankind, and not only the countries of the region, are interested in a positive result of this struggle. It is not fortuitous that the conference of the foreign ministers of non-aligned nations held in New Delhi in February 1981 vigorously demanded that the Indian Ocean should be made a peace zone.

An international conference on the Indian Ocean which is to be convened within the UN framework in Colombo this year will be an important landmark in efforts to secure this noble goal.

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